SIU Director’s Report - Case # 22-OVI-259

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Mandate of the SIU

The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving an official where there has been death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or an allegation of sexual assault. Under the Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019 (SIU Act), officials are defined as police officers, special constables of the Niagara Parks Commission and peace officers under the Legislative Assembly Act. The SIU’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.

Under the SIU Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal offence was committed. If such grounds exist, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the official. Alternatively, in cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director cannot lay charges. Where no charges are laid, a report of the investigation is prepared and released publicly, except in the case of reports dealing with allegations of sexual assault, in which case the SIU Director may consult with the affected person and exercise a discretion to not publicly release the report having regard to the affected person’s privacy interests.

Information Restrictions

Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019

Pursuant to section 34, certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following: 
  • The name of, and any information identifying, a subject official, witness official, civilian witness or affected person. 
  • Information that may result in the identity of a person who reported that they were sexually assaulted being revealed in connection with the sexual assault. 
  • Information that, in the opinion of the SIU Director, could lead to a risk of serious harm to a person. 
  • Information that discloses investigative techniques or procedures.  
  • Information, the release of which is prohibited or restricted by law.  
  • Information in which a person’s privacy interest in not having the information published clearly outweighs the public interest in having the information published. 

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Pursuant to section 14 (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following: 
  • Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and 
  • Information that could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding. 
Pursuant to section 21 (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following: 
  • The names of persons, including civilian witnesses, and subject and witness officials; 
  • Location information; 
  • Witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence; and 
  • Other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation. 

Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004

Pursuant to this legislation, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may also have been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

Mandate Engaged

Pursuant to section 15 of the SIU Act, the SIU may investigate the conduct of officials, be they police officers, special constables of the Niagara Parks Commission or peace officers under the Legislative Assembly Act, that may have resulted in death, serious injury, sexual assault or the discharge of a firearm at a person.

A person sustains a “serious injury” for purposes of the SIU’s jurisdiction if they: sustain an injury as a result of which they are admitted to hospital; suffer a fracture to the skull, or to a limb, rib or vertebra; suffer burns to a significant proportion of their body; lose any portion of their body; or, as a result of an injury, experience a loss of vision or hearing.

In addition, a “serious injury” means any other injury sustained by a person that is likely to interfere with the person’s health or comfort and is not transient or trifling in nature.

This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the serious injuries of a 64-year-old woman (“Complainant #1”) and an 80-year-old woman (“Complainant #2”).

The Investigation

Notification of the SIU

On October 1, 2022, at approximately 11:52 p.m., the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) notified the SIU of the following.

On October 1, 2022, at approximately 7:27 p.m., police were dispatched to a ‘person in crisis’ investigation at a residence in the area of Pickering Beach Road and Bayly Street East, Ajax. The individual had reportedly cut their wrists and requested police. The Subject Official (SO), one of the dispatched police officers, was on his way to the call, travelling eastbound on Highway 2 (Kingston Road West), Ajax, approaching Church Street, when at approximately 7:29 p.m., a westbound civilian vehicle turned left into the plaza at 619 Kingston Road West. The marked police vehicle and civilian vehicle collided.

The civilian vehicle had three occupants, all of whom were transported to the Ajax Pickering Hospital. At the time, only the front passenger complained of back pain. At hospital it was determined the driver and front passenger were clear of any injuries but the rear passenger, Complainant #1, was diagnosed with a fractured pelvis. Her condition was upgraded to critical due to a possible hemorrhage.

Complainant #1 was transferred to Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre for further treatment.

The SO sought medical treatment for a sore finger.

At the time of notification, the civilian vehicle had already been removed to Duffs Towing and the police vehicle had been removed to DRPS 19 Division.

No collision reconstruction or scene photographs were made by DRPS before the scene was cleared.

A motor vehicle collision report was completed by Witness Official (WO) #1.

The Team

Date and time team dispatched: 10/02/2022 at 12:33 a.m.

Date and time SIU arrived on scene: 10/02/2022 at 3:22 a.m.

Number of SIU Investigators assigned: 5
 
Number of SIU Forensic Investigators assigned: 2

Number of SIU Collision Reconstructionists Assigned: 1

Affected Persons (aka “Complainants”):

Complainant #1 64-year-old female; interviewed; medical records obtained and reviewed
Complainant #2 80-year-old female; interviewed; medical records obtained and reviewed

The Complainants were interviewed between October 3 and 25, 2022.

Civilian Witnesses (CW)

CW #1 Interviewed
CW #2 Interviewed
CW #3 Interviewed
CW #4 Interviewed
CW #5 Interviewed

The civilian witnesses were interviewed between October 2 and 5, 2022.

Subject Official

SO Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject official’s legal right

Witness Officials

WO #1 Interviewed
WO #2 Interviewed
WO #3 Interviewed
WO #4 Interviewed

The witness officials were interviewed between October 4, 2022, and December 20, 2022.

Evidence

The Scene

The scene was located on the roadway in front of a plaza located at 619 Kingston Road West. That scene was not held for the SIU, nor was it forensically evaluated or photographed by the DRPS before it was cleared and well before the SIU was notified of this incident.

SIU forensic evaluation of the scene began on October 2, 2022.

Kingston Road West ran, generally, east and west with two marked eastbound lanes with a marked left turn lane for east to north turns onto Church Street, the intersection to the east. There were two marked westbound lanes and raised concrete curbs with driveway cut-outs to allow access into businesses along the road. A raised concrete island separated the eastbound and westbound lanes east of the collision scene. The area was posted with 50 km/h speed limit signs. The roadway was generally straight and level at, to and from the collision scene, and there were overhead streetlights on the north side of the roadway.

The plaza at 619 Kingston Road West was on the south side of Kingston Road West and west of the intersection with Church Street. There were two separate driveway access points into the paved parking lot.

There was a gouge in the left eastbound lane of Kingston Road West. A tire-mark was also located in the left eastbound lane, west of the gouge. An area of road absorbent material was found on the right eastbound lane east of the above-mentioned marks. Scrapes were visible in the entranceway to the plaza.

The area was photographed, and measurements were obtained for a scene drawing.

The distance from the intersection of Kingston Road West and Randall Street to the scene was 370 metres. The distance from the scene to the intersection of Church Street and Kingston Road West was 110 metres.

Scene Diagram

The following image, capturing the plaza at 619 Kingston Road West, from northeast to southwest, was recorded by a SIU forensic investigator.


Figure 1 – View southwest on Kingston Road West towards the plaza

The next image, captured by WO #5, with north oriented essentially to the top, recorded where the SO’s police vehicle had stopped immediately post-collision.


Figure 2 – The SO’s vehicle stopped post-collision (photograph taken by WO #5)

Route taken by police vehicles to the scene

On October 21, 2022, a SIU forensic investigator and a collision reconstructionist video-recorded and photographed the route the investigation revealed police officers drove pre-collision, beginning at the DRPS 19 District, 1710 Kingston Road, Pickering. WO #3 and WO #2 exited the west driveway of the police facility onto Brock Street, and travelled southbound to the intersection at Kingston Road. They turned left (eastbound) onto Kingston Road West, [1] which was a six-lane roadway (two eastbound, two westbound, and two dedicated buses-only lanes and bicycle lanes). The speed was posted at 60 km/h. The area was primarily populated by businesses on both sides of the roadway. There were overhead streetlights on both sides of the roadway. There was a 60 km/h speed sign at 0.3 kilometres of the route.

The police vehicles crossed the Kingston Road West intersection with Bainbridge Drive. That intersection was controlled with overhead traffic signals. The road then curved to the right near its intersection with Southview Drive.
The next intersection, at Notion Road, was controlled with overhead traffic signals at one kilometre into the route and the road narrowed to two eastbound and two westbound paved lanes. There were streetlights on the north side of the roadway.

At 1.1 kilometres of the route, the police vehicles passed a sign indicating that one was entering Ajax and a speed limit sign that 50 km/h had begun. They crossed over a bridge to the intersection of Elizabeth Street, controlled with overhead traffic lights, 1.3 kilometres into the route. Just past that intersection was a second 50 km/h speed limit sign.

At 1.6 kilometres of the route, Kingston Road West intersected with Linton Avenue on the left (north) and Randall Drive on the right (south).

The route culminated at the collision scene - 1.7 kilometres from 19 District DRPS.

There were no sight impediments to obscure oncoming eastbound traffic at the west end of the traffic island at the scene of the collision.

The distance from 19 District to the scene of collision was 1.7 kilometres. The time to travel that distance, respecting speed limits, traffic, and signal lights, was three minutes and 25 seconds. [2]

Physical Evidence

Vehicle Examinations

Police Vehicle

The SO’s DRPS vehicle was a 2021 white Dodge Charger 4-door marked with the graphics adopted by the service and equipped with roof-top emergency lighting. It had extensive front right collision damage. The collision damaged the filaments and bulbs of the right front headlight system. It had a push-bar on the front that was also severely damaged in the collision. The vehicles driver’s side air bag and knee bag had deployed as had the front passenger air bag and both passenger side air bags.

The emergency lighting and vehicle lighting was checked and, except for the right front corner equipment, the lighting functioned as designed. The siren and horn were tested and operated as designed. The check engine light was active as was the low windshield washer level light. It was equipped with a Panasonic Toughbook in the centre console.

An expert mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by a certified mechanic. That process was photographed, and video-recorded. The examination found the vehicle had a broken front right ball joint.


Figure 3 – Front end of the SO’s vehicle

Civilian Vehicle


CW #4 drove a Lexus ES350, 4-door sedan. That vehicle had extensive collision damage to the right rear corner, and the rear bumper and housing was detached from the vehicle. Both right side air bags had deployed. The left rear seatbelt was extended and locked. The vehicle’s lighting system and horn were checked and found to function as designed.

An expert mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by a certified mechanic. That process was photographed, and video-recorded. It was in good working order except for the collision damage.


Figure 4 – The Complainants’ vehicle

Forensic Evidence

GPS/AVL

The police vehicle driven by the SO was equipped with a GPS receiver. The SIU secured a copy of the GPS data in the form of an mp4 video file two minutes and 29 seconds long. The video was a moving screen capture of playback from the GPS data and displayed the time, location, and speed of the police vehicle between 7:20 p.m. (prior to when the SO started to back-up WO #4) and 7:27 p.m., when he started that way. The SO drove eastbound along Kingston Road West, to just west of Church Street, where, at about 7:29 p.m., the collision occurred.

The SIU secured GPS data in the form of a pdf document with 11 points of GPS data from 7:27:06 p.m., to 7:29:31 p.m., as the SO drove southbound on Brock Road, turned left, and drove eastbound on Kingston Road West, in response to the radio call.

On October 28, 2022, additional GPS data were retrieved from the GPS equipment in the vehicle itself. About 50 points of GPS were revealed from 7:27:05 p.m. to 7:31:57 p.m.

Between 7:27:05 p.m., and 7:27:29 p.m., the SO was stationary on Brock Road, at Kingston Road West, in the southbound left turn lane, consistent with being about four cars back from the intersection’s stop line. At 7:27:35 p.m., he accelerated to 15 km/h, southbound, in the left turn lane about three cars back from the stop line. At 7:27:41 p.m., he travelled at 10 km/h, southbound just north of the stop line. At 7:27:46 p.m., he reached 56 km/h, eastbound on Kingston Road West, just east of Brock Road, consistent with having just made a left turn from Brock Road and being in the left-most lane. [3] At 7:27:52 p.m., he reached 99 km/h, eastbound about 175 metres east of Brock Road, in the passing lane. At 7:27:58 p.m., he reached 100 km/h eastbound at the traffic light-controlled intersection of Bainbridge Drive. At 7:28:04 p.m., he reached 85 km/h, about halfway between Bainbridge Drive, and Southview Drive, where there were two eastbound lanes. The SO’s position was consistent with driving in the passing lane or in the common centre left turn lane. At 7:28:10 p.m., he reached 82 km/h, just east of Southview Drive. At 7:28:15 p.m., he was at 92 km/h approaching the traffic light-controlled intersection at Notion Road. At 7:28:20 p.m., he drove at 52 km/h, about 30 metres east of Notion Road. At 7:28:25 p.m., he travelled at 89 km/h, about 135 metres east of Notion Road, in the passing or common centre left turn lane, about even with the “Welcome Ajax” sign, the “Pickering Village” sign, and the speed limit sign indicating that a 50 km/h limit had begun. At 7:28:31 p.m., he reached 93 km/h, about 75 metres west of the traffic light-controlled intersection of Elizabeth Street, in the passing lane. At 7:28:36 p.m., he drove at 53 km/h, eastbound on Kingston Road West, at Elizabeth Street. At 7:28:42 p.m., he was at 88 km/h, about halfway between Elizabeth Street and Linton Avenue/Randall Drive. At 7:28:47 p.m., he had accelerated to 119 km/h, about 50 metres east of Linton Avenue/Randall Drive, in the passing lane. At 7:29:07 p.m., he was down to 114 km/h, about 56 metres west of the eastbound stop line at Kingston Road West’s intersection with Church Street (a traffic light-controlled intersection) in the general area of the collision scene. By 7:29:12 p.m., he was stationary 56 metres west of the Kingston Road West and Church Street intersection. That was post collision.

The SO drove 1.6 kilometres in about 81 seconds.

Mobile Digital Terminal (MDT) Communications

At 7:24 p.m., the SO typed a message to WO #4 asking him not to go (in the basement apartment) alone and to wait for WO #2 and WO #3 to arrive. He also typed a message asking WO #4 to call the suicidal man out of the house. The SO expressed concern for WO #4’s safety.

At 7:26 p.m., the SO typed another message to inform WO #4 that the man had told the call-taker he was “not bleeding much”. He asked WO #4 to have the call-taker ask the man to go outside.

At 7:29 p.m., [4] WO #4 typed an apology for delayed responses to the SO’s messages saying he could not reply because he was driving through roundabouts.

Expert Evidence

Technical Collision Investigation

Area of impact determination

The area of impact of the collision was determined to be in eastbound lane #1 (passing lane) at the driveway entrance to 619 Kingston Road West, about 83 metres west of the eastbound stop line at the traffic light-controlled Church Street intersection. As was seen on Body-worn camera (BWC) footage, there was a trail of fluid in the centre of that lane leading from the area of impact towards the final resting position of the SO’s police vehicle. Within the area of impact was a gouge and a tire mark likely from the passenger side rear tire of CW #4’s vehicle as it was forced sideways and downwards during the collision.

Weather/Roads Conditions

The weather and road conditions were good and not a contributing factor in the collision.

Traffic Conditions


The traffic at the time of the collision was moderate.

Visibility (or View Obstructions)


CW #4 slowed and turned left from the centre of Kingston Road West about ten to 14 metres west of the west end of a raised centre island. The distance from which eastbound traffic on Kingston Road West was visible from that location was sufficient that neither visibility, nor view obstructions, were a factor that contributed to this collision. The SO’s approaching police vehicle (speed notwithstanding) would be visible to CW #4 before and when he turned, and the Lexus would have been visible to the SO as he drove eastbound. There was nothing to suggest the SO did not see the Lexus.

Examination of the Police Vehicle

Collision damage occurred to the front passenger side corner. That damage was moderate to severe. The professional mechanical analysis of the vehicle revealed no issues or concerns regarding its mechanical fitness, and nothing that would be contributory to the collision.

Examination of the Lexus

Collision damage was to the passenger side rear, behind the wheel. The damage was moderate. The professional mechanical analysis of the vehicle raised no issues or concerns regarding the mechanical fitness of the Lexus, and nothing that would be contributory to the collision.

CDR Data


On October 3, 2022, CDR data were retrieved from both vehicles.

The CDR data from the police vehicle were consistent with the GPS data and revealed that, at the time of the collision, the SO wore his seat belt.

Five seconds prior to the collision, the SO drove at 116 km/h with the accelerator pedal depressed to 74 percent. The brake was not on. There was eight degrees (very little) steering input to the left. At that time, the SO was eastbound, just west of the intersection of Kingston Road West and Linton Avenue/Randall Drive, and about 151 metres west of the area of impact. He was about 465 metres east of the Village of Ajax sign where the speed limit decreased to 50 km/h.

Four seconds before the collision, the SO drove at 118 km/h. The accelerator pedal was not depressed. The brake pedal was off. There was four degrees (very little) steering input to the left. The SO was just east of Linton Avenue and about 118 metres west of the area of impact.

Three seconds prior to the collision, the SO drove eastbound at 116 km/h. The accelerator pedal was not depressed. The brake was off. There was two degrees (very little) steering input to the right. The SO was about 87 metres west of the area of impact.

Between three and about two seconds before the collision, the accelerator pedal was depressed and increased from eight percent to 20 percent. The brake was off. There was almost no input to the steering (meaning the SO steered straight).

Two seconds before the collision, the SO maintained a speed of 116 km/h. The accelerator pedal was depressed 20 percent. It subsequently increased to 21 percent, then decreased. The brake was off. The SO was about 55 metres west of the area of impact.

One-and-a-half seconds before collision, the accelerator pedal was at zero percent and the SO applied the brakes. The rate of speed was 116 km/h. The anti-lock brake system activated less than one-half-second later, indicating a hard brake application. There was almost no input to the steering other than straight. The SO was about 38 metres west of the area of impact.

One second before the collision, the speed was 96 km/h. The accelerator was at zero percent and the brakes were on. The SO steered to the left. He was about 23 metres west of the area of impact.

At about the moment of impact, the SO’s rate of speed was 73 km/h. The accelerator pedal was zero percent, the brakes were on, and steering was 77 degrees left.

The following was extrapolated from the Lexus.

CW #4 and Complainant #2 (the front seat passenger) wore their seat belts. The rear seat passenger seat belt use was not captured.

About four seconds before the collision, CW #4 drove at 4 km/h. The accelerator was depressed; the brake was not. CW #4 was in westbound lane #1 (the passing lane) about ten metres west of the end of the raised centre island, and about ten metres from the area of impact.

Between about three seconds and one second before collision, CW #4 increased to ten km/h and then 14 km/h. The accelerator was depressed; the brake was not. He drove from about nine metres from the area of impact to about four metres from the area of impact, which was across the centre lines of the road and into where the eastbound left turn lane had begun.

Two tenths of a second before impact, the brake was applied, the accelerator rate lessened, and CW #4 increased to 16 km/h.

At about the moment of impact, CW #4 drove at 12 km/h. The accelerator was depressed, and the brakes were off.

Findings from the Physical Evidence

The SO drove eastbound on Kingston Road West from Brock Road in response to a call for service. His flashing emergency lights were activated. It was not clear if the siren was activated. He was followed by a second police vehicle with its emergency lights activated.

The speed limit on Kingston Road West, east of Brock Road, and to the Village of Ajax was 60 km/h. There were two eastbound and two westbound lanes with intersections, driveways and a common centre left turn lane. As the two police vehicles entered the Village of Ajax, the road layout narrowed and the buildings became closer to the road. The speed limit decreased to 50 km/h.

The SO drove through the intersection of Kingston Road West and Elizabeth Street and continued eastbound. There were many businesses and driveways on Kingston Road West. The SO approached Church Street. It was about 7:30 p.m. on a Saturday evening in early October. It was dusk. The traffic was moderate.

Between five seconds prior to impact, and three seconds prior to impact, the SO drove from about 150 metres west of the area of impact, to about 50 metres west of the area of impact, at speeds between 116 km/h to 119 km/h. The accelerator pedal was depressed 74 percent full as he entered the intersection of Kingston Road West and Linton Avenue/Randall Drive. He released the accelerator pedal as he passed through that intersection; he did not brake. He maintained pressure on the accelerator as he approached the location where CW #4 was moving slowly westbound. Between four seconds prior to impact and two seconds prior to the impact, CW #4 drove slowly, in the westbound lane #1 (passing lane) just past the raised centre island and near the entrance driveway to 619 Kingston Road West. CW #4 did not brake. About two seconds prior to the collision, the SO was about 137 metres from the eastbound stop line at the Church Street lighted intersection. He drove at 116 km/h. The accelerator was depressed to 20 percent. The brake was off. He steered straight ahead. CW #4 accelerated, and turned left across the eastbound lanes into the path of the SO, and towards the entrance driveway or perhaps a few metres west of the west curb of the entrance driveway. About one-half-second after CW #4 turned, the SO braked, consistent with having reacted to the movement of the Lexus. CW #4 briefly braked. CW #4 turned in front of the SO. The SO further reacted to CW #4’s turn by steering to the left. The collision occurred. The SO continued to brake and brought his police vehicle to a controlled stop in the eastbound passing lane east of the area of impact. The Lexus rotated out of control clockwise about 180 degrees and came to rest facing northeast, just south of the area of impact.

Collision Reconstructionist Evidence

The SO drove at 116 km/h when he first braked. The distance between the brake application to where he stopped post-collision was about 65 metres. Had the collision not occurred, the police vehicle would have required about the same distance to skid to a stop from 116 km/h.

Using the factor at which the SO was known to have decelerated from when CW #4 turned and the SO applied the brakes, to the collision, and considering the SO braked when he was about 38 metres from the collision, had the SO been driving at 85 km/h or less, he would have been able to brake and skid to a stop prior to a collision.

The Highway Traffic Act

In section 142(1), there is an onus on the driver of a vehicle turning left into a driveway to first see the movement can be made safely. It would appear CW #4 failed to properly judge the speed of the approaching police vehicle and failed to recognize the police vehicle as a police vehicle with flashing emergency lights.

Conclusions Based on the Physical Evidence

As per the GPS and the CDR data, the SO drove at 116 to 119 km/h in a posted 50 km/h zone in the Village of Ajax, in moderate, early Saturday evening traffic, through an intersection, and past a number of businesses and driveways as he approached the vehicle driven by CW #4. CW #4 was about to turn from westbound into a driveway on the south side. Had the SO been driving at 85 km/h, or less, he would have been able to avoid a collision.

Video/Audio/Photographic Evidence

The SIU searched for and obtained audio, video and/or photographic records of relevance, as set out below.
 

911 Call and Police Communications Recordings – Suicidal Male

911 Call

On October 1, 2022, at 7:19:45 p.m., the DRPS received a 911 call from a man who reported he had cut himself with a knife and was in the basement apartment at an address near Pickering Beach Road and Bayly Street East. The phone call lasted 11 minutes and two seconds. He still had the knife and had been drinking alcohol. He reported the cut he made was on his wrist and not very deep, and he had applied pressure to the wound. It was not bleeding much. The man had been recently diagnosed with depression and had previously been admitted to hospital for that condition. He had also, previously, cut his arm. He felt like he was about to pass out.

While still on the line with 911 a police officer [now known to be WO #4] arrived at the man’s home. The dispatcher asked the man to go outside and meet the police officer but to leave the knife inside. The man walked outside and met WO #4.

Communications Recordings


On October 1, 2022, at 7:23 p.m., police officers in 19 District were alerted they were required at a residence in the area of Pickering Beach Road and Bayly Street East, Ajax, for an attempted suicide call. A man was at his home alone and had cut his wrists with a knife. The knife was still with him. WO #4 responded that he would attend the call. WO #1 made a broadcast saying WO #3 and WO #2 would also attend the call. At 7:26 p.m., the SO put himself on the call.

At 7:28 p.m., WO #4 broadcast he was at the driveway and waiting for additional police officers to arrive.

The next broadcast was WO #3 saying there had been a departmental motor vehicle collision at Highway 2 (also known as Kingston Road West) and Church Street. At 7:29 p.m., the SO advised he was fine and would check the other driver.

911 and Police Communications Recordings – Collision

911 Call

On October 1, 2022, at 7:29:14 p.m., CW #5 called 911. The call lasted three minutes and 20 seconds. She requested fire, police, and an ambulance to 28 Old Kingston Road, Ajax. She told the call-taker two police vehicles passed her with their lights and sirens activated. She heard a crash and ran to the location of the crash. She arrived to find a collision between a police vehicle [now known to be driven by the SO] and a grey vehicle [now known to have been occupied by Complainant #1, Complainant #2 and CW #4]. The police officers were out of their police vehicles and were walking around the collision site. The SO’s police vehicle was in front of the dry cleaners [now known to be Snow White Drycleaners] [6] with a damaged front end. The grey vehicle was in a driveway [now known to be 619 Kingston Road West]. A second police vehicle [now known to have been occupied by WO #3 and WO #2] was parked on the street in front of the Mumbay Grill Restaurant.

Communications Recordings

On October 1, 2022, at 7:28 p.m., a radio transmission from the callsign assigned to WO #2 and WO #3 advised of a departmental motor vehicle collision at Highway 2 and Church Street.

At 7:29 p.m., the SO broadcast he was fine and would check the other vehicle. WO #2 broadcast that police were still required to attend the occurrence the involved police vehicles were initially headed towards (the matter involving the suicidal male). At 7:30 p.m., WO #3 asked for paramedics and firefighters. He also said airbags had been deployed.

At 7:35 p.m., WO #1 broadcast both the driver and a passenger in the civilian vehicle were 80-years-old, and were complaining of neck and back pain.

BWC Footage

The SO

Recorded on October 1, 2022, between 7:29 p.m., and 8:03 p.m., the SO’s BWC, when activated, captured him sitting behind the steering wheel of his police vehicle. The air bag had deployed. Eighteen seconds later, he exited his police vehicle and walked towards CW #4’s vehicle. He made a short telephone call telling someone that somebody had to continue to the call he had been responding to. As the SO approached the Complainant’s vehicle, he encountered WO #3 who asked if he was alright. He replied he was fine, but his hand hurt. WO #3 inquired a second time and, again, the SO said his hand hurt but was okay. The SO told WO #3 that, “He hesitated too. He was like watching me.” [7]

At 7:32 p.m., WO #1 arrived, approached the SO, and told him to mute his BWC before the two walked up the road and engaged in an off-audio conversation. At 7:34 p.m., that conversation concluded. The SO’s BWC remained muted the rest of his time at the scene as he paced. He continued to have contact with police officers at the scene.

WO #3

The footage from WO #3’s BWC was recorded on October 1, 2022, between 7:29 p.m., and 7:59 p.m. When activated, the camera captured WO #3 getting out from the passenger’s side of the police vehicle he was in. In the distance, a vehicle (discovered to be driven by CW #4) blocked the curb lane of Kingston Road West. The right rear wheel was at or on the curb line of a driveway to 619 Kingston Road. Further down the road was a blur of emergency lights from a police vehicle (that had been driven by the SO). It sat in the second lane closest to the centre line. There was a fluid trail that began at the area of impact, in the middle of the second lane, and then angled slightly to the right as it reached the police vehicle. The police vehicle’s right rear wheel was on the centre line between the two eastbound lanes. The roadway was scattered with debris. A man (CW #4) stood at the driver’s door of his car and told WO #3 he did not see the lights. A second man (later identified as CW #2) said he made a mistake. He told CW #4 not to say anything else. WO #3 took exception to CW #2 interfering and said, “It’s not an accident, it’s a collision, an intentional act.” WO #3 told CW #4 he should not be driving and told him to sit back in his car. At about 7:30 p.m., the SO walked towards WO #3, and WO #3 asked if he was okay. The SO said his hand hurt and shook his head. He paced about the area.

At 7:32 p.m., a police officer (WO #1) arrived, and WO #3 told her CW #4 had made a left turn in front of the SO, while he had his lights and siren on. WO #1 and the SO walked away in conversation.

WO #3 later told WO #1 he was right behind the SO and saw the whole thing. CW #4 had turned left turn in front of the SO, and both the police vehicles had their sirens and emergency lighting systems activated.

The SO, who stood nearby, said CW #4 literally stopped his car and looked at the SO before he turned.

At 7:37 p.m., WO #3 again spoke to WO #1 and told her he and the SO were in the inside lane. WO #3 saw CW #4 set up for a left turn, and then CW #4 proceeded. The SO had no time to react.

At 7:37 p.m., an acting inspector, Officer #1, arrived and had a conversation with the SO. The SO told him he was going to back-up another police officer attending a ‘suicidal man’ call.

At 7:57 p.m., WO #3 asked WO #1, “If doing a level two?” WO #1 replied in the negative. WO #3 asked about the woman (later learned to be Complainant #1) in the back, saying she was screaming like she had been shot. WO #1 replied that Complainant #1 had back, shoulder and rib pain, and would have taken most of the impact, but nothing was life threatening.

WO #2


Recorded on October 1, 2022, between 7:29 p.m. and 8:15 p.m., WO #2’s camera, when activated, captured him as he got out on the driver’s side of his police vehicle. WO #3 was captured exiting the passenger side. About 28 seconds later, the BWC’s audio came on. WO #2 asked the SO if he was alright, and the SO said he was.

At 7:29 p.m., WO #2 moved his police vehicle to block a portion of Kingston Road West.

At 7:31 p.m., a woman (Complainant #1), who was in the back of the Complainants’ vehicle, said her legs and back hurt. WO #2 followed WO #3 as he gathered identification, and, at one point, asked, “What do you need from me [WO #3]?” The response, if any, was not audible. WO #2 walked about or watched from a distance as firefighters looked after the people in the Complainants’ vehicle. WO #3 and WO #1 investigated the collision.

At 7:37 p.m., WO #2 stood by WO #3 as he gave his account of events to WO #1.

At 7:45 p.m., WO #2 turned his audio off as Officer #1 arrived. Officer #1’s initial conversations were not captured, nor were subsequent conversations between WO #3, the SO and WO #1.
At 7:55 p.m., the audio was turned back on, but turned off again at 7:58 p.m. when WO #1 and WO #3 had a conversation. WO #3 stood with the SO for a brief time.

At 8:01 p.m., WO #2 walked to Officer #1, WO #1, WO #3 and SO as the SO’s hand and arm were washed by a paramedic.

At 8:12 p.m., he approached the SO and WO #3 who were in conversation. WO #1 joined the group.

At 8:16 p.m., the recording stopped as the group broke-up and WO #2 walked away.

WO #1


WO #1’s BWC footage was recorded on October 1, 2022, between 7:32 p.m. and 8:19 p.m. At 7:32 p.m., she arrived at the collision and, within five seconds, her audio was turned on. WO #3 immediately reported that a car (driven by CW #4) turned in front of the SO. WO #1 interrupted WO #3 by saying, “I’m on,” and kept walking. Within 25 seconds, WO #1 approached the SO, and told him to come with her and to “turn your thing on blue”. Both police officers turned off the audio associated with their respective BWCs and had a conversation which ended as they walked towards CW #4’s vehicle.

At 7:34 p.m., WO #1 continued about the scene, her camera on mute. She went to the driver’s door and front passenger door of CW #4’s vehicle. Firefighters were at the rear doors of the vehicle.

At 7:37 p.m., WO #1 had a conversation with WO #3, the SO and WO #2, followed by a conversation with paramedics.

At 7:41 p.m., WO #1 turned the audio component of her BWC back on and spoke with CW #4, who told her his right-side ribs hurt. WO #1 introduced herself as the supervisor responsible for doing the investigation. CW #4 told her he was making a left turn and had made sure he could see the road properly to make the left turn safely. He said he never saw the police car coming because “he” [8] drove too fast. At that point, WO #1 told CW #4 her BWC was recording. CW #4 further explained he was going west and wanted to turn into the Mumbay Grill. The police vehicle travelled east, CW #4 never saw or heard a siren, and the police vehicle came too fast. He said the situation was “unbelievable” and that his wife was in front passenger seat, and his sister was in the back.

At 7:45 p.m., WO #1 spoke with CW #3, who told her she saw her father about to make a left turn. She heard no sirens, nor did she see any police vehicles. CW #4 began his left turn and suddenly a police vehicle hit him, and a second police vehicle came right after.

At 7:46 p.m., WO #1 spoke to Officer #1 and told him CW #4 did not see the police, made a left-hand turn, and was struck. The SO was driving at a high speed to get to a ‘suicide with a knife’ call. He told her he knew his emergency lights were on but was not sure about his siren because the SO was changing “in between”. She told Officer #1 that the SO had an injury but was okay. She also told him CW #4 was at fault for making a turn unsafely. She said all injuries to the civilians were non-life-threatening back pains, but that she would get an update.

At 7:50 p.m., a paramedic told WO #1 that Complainant #2 had minor back pains, but her ‘vitals’ had not been taken and a second ambulance was coming.

WO #1 continued to collect personal information and arranged for tow trucks.

At 7:54 p.m., WO #1 went to the Complainant’s vehicle and spoke with Complainant #1, who told her she was hurting more now. WO #1 told her an ambulance had just arrived. Complainant #1 said she was in a lot of pain on her side and in several other locations. She said she saw the police vehicle but was spoken over when she described when she saw the police vehicle. WO #1 later told Officer #1 it was when they were turning.

At 7:57 p.m., WO #3 asked WO #1, “If doing a level two?” WO #1 replied in the negative. WO #3 asked about Complainant #1 saying she was screaming like she had been shot. WO #1 replied that Complainant #1 had back, shoulder and rib pain, and would have taken most of the impact, but nothing was life threatening.

At 7:59 p.m., WO #1 told Officer #1 she would lay a ‘careless driving’ charge and clear up the scene before she went to the hospital.

A paramedic confirmed the SO was okay, and his hand was washed to remove air bag chemicals.

WO #1 again turned the audio component of her BWC off and had further conversations with the SO, emergency personnel, and tow truck drivers, until she got back into her police vehicle.
 

Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) Footage – 109 Old Kingston Road

On October 4, 2022, the SIU obtained two videos from the plaza at 109 Old Kingston Road. Both videos were dated October 1, 2022. The first was 12 seconds long, the second 14 seconds. The camera faced west towards the intersection of Kingston Road West, and Elizabeth Street.

At 7:28:35 p.m., two police vehicles were captured travelling eastbound on Kingston Road West through a green traffic light at the intersection at Elizabeth Street, headed towards Church Street. Both police vehicles had emergency warning lights activated and travelled in the passing lane.

At 7:30:38 p.m., a third police vehicle travelled eastbound on Kingston Road West through a green traffic light at that same intersection headed towards Church Street.

CCTV Footage – 625 Kingston Road West

On October 4, 2022, the SIU obtained two videos from 625 Kingston Road West. They were dated October 1, 2022. The first was one minute and 33 seconds long, and the second was 40 seconds. Both videos were from the same camera that faced northeast towards the site of the collision. Trees and front porch pillars obscured the view of the collision site.

At 6:28:45 p.m., [9] a police vehicle [now known to be driven by the SO] travelled eastbound in the passing lane headed towards Church Street with its emergency lights activated. [10] The police vehicle passed behind trees that obscured the camera’s view of the road.

At 6:28:50 p.m., a second DRPS vehicle [now known to be driven by WO #2] travelled eastbound in the passing lane of traffic headed towards Church Street with the emergency lighting system activated. WO #2 and WO #3’s vehicle stopped in the passing lane of traffic at the property line between 625 Kingston Road West and 619 Kingston Road West. There was no eastbound civilian vehicular traffic until 6:29:24 p.m. All civilian vehicle traffic moved at a slow rate of speed and passed WO #2 and WO #3’s police vehicle on the left.

At 6:30:00 p.m., the police vehicle was moved forward behind trees, which obscured the camera’s view of the road.

At 6:36:50 p.m., a third police vehicle arrived and parked in the curbside lane of traffic in front of 625 Kingston Road West.

Durham Transit Bus #1 Video

On October 4, 2022, the SIU obtained video from the CCTV cameras aboard Durham Region Transit Bus #1. The video was dated October 1, 2022, and started at 7:36:00 p.m. The video was a six-minute multiplexed grid view of eight cameras installed on the bus.

At 7:36 p.m., the bus travelled westbound on Kingston Road West. At 7:39 p.m., the bus passed the collision scene at 619 Kingston Road West. The camera which faced the collision site to the south was obscured as it passed due to a parked fire truck with emergency warning lights activated.

Durham Transit Bus #2 Video

On October 4, 2022, the SIU obtained video from the CCTV cameras aboard Durham Region Transit Bus #2. The video, dated October 1, 2022, held no value.

Anonymously Posted YouTube Video

Posted on December 13, 2022, a YouTube video, four minutes and 32 seconds long, captured the aftermath of the October 1, 2022, collision in front of 619 Kingston Road West. The videographer verbalized his observations of the scene and what preceded the recording. The video showed CW #4’s vehicle stopped facing northeast on Kingston Road West across the westbound curb lane. It was partially in the entrance of the driveway at 619 Kingston Road West with the back of the vehicle and rear passenger tire straddling the curb.

A man was filmed exiting the passenger side of an unrelated vehicle and the videographer exited the driver’s side of that same vehicle. The reflection of emergency lights radiated off the area. Two police officers [now known to be WO #3 and WO #2] ran on Kingston Road West, as did between four to six civilians, towards (CW #4’s) Lexus.

The videographer spoke, but his face was not shown on video. He said, “This cop right here was speeding through,” as the video panned westbound towards the intersection at Church Street showing the police vehicle [now known to be driven by the SO] stopped further west of CW #4’s vehicle. The videographer said the police vehicle had its emergency lights activated but its siren was not running. The emergency lights were still activated on the police vehicle driven by the SO. In the background, WO #3 yelled at CW #4 because he turned in front of a police vehicle.

The video panned back to the Lexus, where WO #3 stood with CW #4. Six civilians stood on the sidewalk. The videographer commented on the scene and the actions of those in the video. He said WO #3 was saying the driver of the Lexus was at fault for turning in front of the police vehicle. He continued, “Oh no, absolutely crazy. This cop right here was flying, doing about 160 km/h at least.” The video panned back and forth to the SO’s police vehicle, civilians, CW #4’s vehicle, passing traffic, and stationary emergency vehicles. The videographer said, “He had his lights on but there were no sirens, no noise being made.” He continued, “Absolutely silent, this gentleman made a left turn and was trying to get out of the guy’s way, the cop was going at a lightning speed, absolute lightning speed. This gentleman is lucky to be alive … And now the guy making the turn is being blamed for what happened just now.”

Sirens were heard approaching the scene where they stopped. The videographer said, “Oh ya, that’s what it sounds like when you have an emergency, when you’re flying through a neighbourhood that’s what it sounds like when you have an emergency … this guy was flying through here at 160 km/h I would say at least, totally silent so what if your lights were flashing, make some noise.”

The videographer approached a woman and asked if she had been involved. She replied that her father had been involved. The video ended.

Computer-aided Dispatch (CAD) – Suicidal Male

The CAD originating from the 911 call made by a man reporting a suicide attempt recorded, that, at 7:24 p.m., WO #4 was en route to the call.

At 7:27 p.m., the SO was recorded as en route. It also recorded that WO #3 and WO #2 were going.

At 7:28 p.m., WO #4 was at the driveway and waiting for another police officer.

At 7:29 p.m., the SO was updated as “pre-empted”. At 7:31 p.m., WO #3 and WO #2 were also “pre-empted”.

CAD – Collision

The CAD relevant to the collision recorded entries made between 7:29 p.m. and 4:11 a.m., October 1, 2022, to October 2, 2022.

At 7:29 p.m., the SO was recorded as at the collision location. Information from a 911 caller [now known to be CW #5] indicated a police officer was out of his police vehicle and appeared to be fine. CW #5 said airbags had been deployed.

At 7:31 p.m., WO #1 was en route. WO #3 and WO #2 were marked as having arrived at the location. WO #1 was shown as having arrived at the location at 7:32 p.m.

At 7:36 p.m., WO #1’s noted that an 80-year-old passenger of the civilian vehicle was complaining of neck and back pain.

At 7:43 p.m., Officer #1 arrived.

At 7:53 p.m. and 7:54 p.m., WO #1 requested tow trucks.

Materials Obtained from Police Service

Upon request, the SIU received the following materials from the DRPS between October 4 and December 14, 2022:
• GPS/AVL data;
• Communications recordings;
• Police Vehicle Operations Directive - Appendix A Marked General Patrol Vehicle Equipment List;
• Police Vehicle Operations Directive - Appendix B Seatbelt Assemblage and Safety Component Sensors;
• Police Vehicle Operations Directive - Appendix C Abbreviated Call Priority Assessment Guide;
• Police Vehicle Operations Directive - Appendix D Stopping Distances;
• Police Vehicle Operations Directive - Appendix E DRPS Sentina Seatbelt Assemblage and System Preparation;
CAD Reports;
BWC footage;
• GPS Data Log (every 5 sec);
• Directive – Body Worn Camera;
• Directive – Special Investigations Unit;
• Directive – Motor Vehicle Collision Investigations;
• Directive – Police Vehicle Operations and Safe Arrival;
• Duty Book Notes - WO #1;
• Duty Book Notes - WO #3;
• Duty Book Notes - WO #2;
• GPS/AVL Fact Sheet;
MDT Message Logs;
• Motor Vehicle Collision Report completed by WO #1;
• Police Vehicle Operation Training Record – the SO;
• Police witness statement – WO #1;
• Police witness statement – WO #2;
• Police witness statement – WO #3;
• Repair and maintenance records for the SO’s vehicle;
• Social media video;
• Duty Book Notes-WO #4; and
CDR Reports.

Materials Obtained from Other Sources

The SIU obtained and reviewed the following records from other sources:
• Medical records – Complainant #2;
• Medical records – Complainant #1;
CCTV video – 625 Kingston Road West;
CCTV video – Durham Region Transit Buses;
CCTV video – 109 Old Kingston Road;
• Social media video – anonymous; and
• Photographs – CW #5.

Incident Narrative

The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with police and civilian eyewitnesses, video footage that captured the incident in parts, and data recovered from the involved vehicles relating to their speeds and movements, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO chose not to interview with the SIU or authorize the release of his notes.

In the evening of October 1, 2022, CW #4 was operating a Lexus sedan travelling west on Kingston Road west of the Church Street intersection. With him in the front passenger seat was his wife – Complainant #2. His sister-in-law – Complainant #1 – was seated in the rear driver-side seat. They were intending to turn left about 80 metres west of the intersection into a plaza that housed the Mumbay Grill. CW #4 slowed in the westbound passing lane opposite the driveway into the plaza, waited for an eastbound vehicle to clear his location, and started into his turn. The Lexus was straddling the two eastbound lanes when its rear passenger-side was struck by a marked police cruiser.

The operator of the cruiser – the SO – was travelling eastward at speed in the passing lane at the time of the collision. He was en route to a scene involving a male who had cut himself with a knife and was threatening suicide. The intention was to arrive quickly in order to assist a relatively new officer – WO #4 – at a call for service involving a weapon. At five, four, three and two seconds prior to impact, the SO was travelling at 116, 118, 116 and 116 km/h, respectively. At one second prior to impact, about 38 metres from the site of the collision, the officer was travelling at 96 km. He was down to 73 km/h at about the point of impact. These speeds were recorded within a stretch of roadway governed by a 50 km/h speed limit. The cruiser’s emergency lights were active throughout.

Following the collision, the Lexus came to rest facing northeast in the eastbound lanes of Kingston Road, opposite the plaza. The cruiser continued east a distance and came to a stop on Kingston Road before the Church Street intersection.

CW #4, Complainant #2 and Complainant #1 were transported to hospital from the scene. Complainant #1 was diagnosed with multiple fractures and other internal injuries. Complainant #2 was initially discharged from hospital without a serious injury diagnosis but was eventually found to have suffered broken ribs. CW #4 was fortunate to have escaped serious injury.

Relevant Legislation

Section 320.13 (1) Criminal Code – Dangerous Operation Causing Bodily Harm

320.13 (1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public.

(2) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public and, as a result, causes bodily harm to another person.

Section 128(13), Highway Traffic Act – Police Vehicles and Speeding

128(13) The speed limits prescribed under this section or any regulation or by-law passed under this section do not apply to,

(b) a police department vehicle being used in the lawful performance of a police officer’s duties.

Analysis and Director's Decision

Complainant #1 and Complainant #2 were seriously injured in a motor vehicle collision in Ajax on October 1, 2022. As their vehicle had been struck by a DRPS cruiser, the SIU was notified and initiated an investigation. The driver of the cruiser, the SO, was identified as the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the collision.

The offence that arises for consideration is dangerous driving causing bodily harm contrary to section 320.13(2) of the Criminal Code. As an offence of penal negligence, a simple want of care will not suffice to give rise to liability. Rather, the offence is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the circumstances. In the instant case, the issue is whether there was a want of care in the manner in which the SO operated his vehicle, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction, that caused or contributed to the collision. In my view, there was not.

There are aspects of the SO’s conduct that are subject to legitimate scrutiny. Chief among these is the officer’s speed - within a range of about 114 to 120 km/h – less than ten seconds and under 200 metres from the scene of the collision. At that speed, the officer’s cruiser constituted a danger on the roadway - it was more than twice the speed limit (almost two-and-a-half times at points) as it headed towards a traffic light-controlled intersection (Church Street) across a developed area of town with a number of commercial establishments on both sides of Kingston Road. The officer also neglected to make continuous use of his siren, which would have served to give pedestrians and motorists in the area some added notice of his presence, direction of travel, and speed. These factors, I am satisfied, contributed in some measure to the collision with CW #4’s Lexus. For example, the SO’s speed effectively foreclosed his ability to come to a stop before the point of impact as CW #4 turned in front of him. Lastly, the SO was not responding to a situation requiring his presence as soon as possible. There was no suggestion, for example, that the person who had threatened suicide had also threatened others. And the officer on scene – WO #4 – had broadcast that he would wait for the arrival of additional officers before approaching the person.

Though the SO’s conduct created significant risks to public safety, however, I am satisfied that it fell short of constituting a marked departure from a reasonable standard of care when weighed in the balance with several extenuating considerations. Officers operating cruisers engaged in the execution of their duties are exempt from the speeding limitations by virtue of section 128(13)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act. This does not mean that police officers are free to speed as they wish without regard to public safety risk factors. It does mean, however, that an officer’s training in high-speed driving and law enforcement interests must figure into the public safety calculus. In the instant case, the officer might better have thought of the need to speed as he did given the nature of the call and his environment, but I am unable to dismiss his concerns out of hand. WO #4 was a new officer with little experience dealing with a potentially volatile situation involving a knife, and it was open for the SO to believe that he might need help sooner rather than later. It is also true that the SO had his emergency lights on as he approached CW #4, who was intending to turn left. CW #4 was under a twin legal duty in the circumstances - to refrain from turning left until he could do so safely, and to yield to police. It remains unclear why CW #4 did not see the officer’s emergency lights - other motorists had seen the SO and pulled over to let the officer pass. Be that as it may, the officer would have had reason to believe that CW #4 had seen him and would maintain his position until the cruiser passed his location. Finally, the SO’s indiscretions, if they be such, occurred over a relatively short period of time – under ten seconds and 200 metres. I do not say that the officer’s speed amounted to a momentary lapse of judgement, which the cases suggest will only exceptionally amount to a marked departure. It would seem the SO intended to accelerate to the speeds he did and did so over a significant amount of time. However, it does bear noting that the SO’s conduct during this time represented a relatively small part of the officer’s overall driving en route to the scene of the collision.

For the foregoing reasons, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO transgressed the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law in connection with the collision that occurred with CW #4’s vehicle. As such, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed.


Date: February 7, 2023


Electronically approved by


Joseph Martino
Director
Special Investigations Unit

Endnotes

  • 1) It is believed that was where WO #3 and WO #2 fell in behind the SO. [Back to text]
  • 2) Based on Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) / Global Positioning System (GPS) / Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) data, the SO drove that route and covered 1.6 of those kilometres in about 81 seconds. [Back to text]
  • 3) The posted speed limit there was 60 km/h. [Back to text]
  • 4) Though the 7:29 p.m. message available for the SO to read was not accurately time-stamped to the second, it is of note that the collision occurred between 7:29:07 p.m. and 7:29:12 p.m. [Back to text]
  • 5) The following records contain sensitive personal information and are not being released pursuant to section 34(2) of the Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019. The material portions of the records are summarized below. [Back to text]
  • 6) The address for Snow White Drycleaners was 1-613 Kingston Road West in Ajax. [Back to text]
  • 7) It is believed the SO was referring to CW #4. [Back to text]
  • 8) Referring to the SO. [Back to text]
  • 9) All camera times were one hour behind the actual time. [Back to text]
  • 10) As the video had no audio component, it could not speak to the activation of the siren. [Back to text]

Note:

The signed English original report is authoritative, and any discrepancy between that report and the French and English online versions should be resolved in favour of the original English report.