SIU Director’s Report - Case # 16-PCD-121

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Mandate of the SIU

The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving police officers where there has been death, serious injury or allegations of sexual assault. The Unit’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.

Under the Police Services Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether an officer has committed a criminal offence in connection with the incident under investigation. If, after an investigation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the officer. Alternatively, in all cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director does not lay criminal charges but files a report with the Attorney General communicating the results of an investigation.

Information restrictions

Freedom of Information and Protection of Personal Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)

Pursuant to section 14 of FIPPA (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

  • Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and
  • Information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding.

Pursuant to section 21 of FIPPA (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this document. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

  • subject officer name(s)
  • witness officer name(s)
  • civilian witness name(s)
  • location information
  • witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence and
  • other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation

Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (“PHIPA”)

Pursuant to PHIPA, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may have also been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

Mandate engaged

The Unit’s investigative jurisdiction is limited to those incidents where there is a serious injury (including sexual assault allegations) or death in cases involving the police.

“Serious injuries” shall include those that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. “Serious Injury” shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide on the extent of its involvement.

This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the suicide by a 41-year-old male on May 13, 2016.

The investigation

Notification of the SIU

On May 13, 2016 at 12:59 p.m., the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) notified the SIU that at approximately 6:40 a.m., a woman called the police to report that as a result of a marriage breakdown, her husband went into the garage. She was concerned because he had firearms.

At 7:00 a.m., police officers arrived at the residence in Nation Township, Hawkesbury. At 9:00 a.m., the Tactical Unit arrived and tried to make contact with the Complainant, who was still inside the garage. After a robot was used to break the door down, the Complainant was found hanging from a beam in the garage.

The Team

Number of SIU Investigators assigned: 4

Number of SIU Forensic Investigators assigned: 2

SIU Forensic Investigators responded to the scene and identified and preserved evidence. They documented the relevant scenes associated with the incident by way of notes, photography, sketches and measurements. The Forensic Investigators attended and recorded the post-mortem examination.

Complainant:

41-year-old male, deceased

Civilian Witnesses

CW Interviewed

Witness Officers

WO #1 Interviewed

WO #2 Interviewed

WO #3 Interviewed

WO #4 Interviewed

WO #5 Interviewed

WO #6 Interviewed

WO #7 Interviewed

WO #8 Interviewed

WO #9 Interviewed

Additionally, the notes from nine other officers (Additional Officers) were received and reviewed. After a review of their notes, it was apparent that the Additional Officers either took up containment positions or were not directly involved in attempting to communicate with the Complainant or in breaching his garage door. Therefore they were not interviewed.

Subject Officers

SO #1 Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject officer’s legal right.

SO #2 Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject officer’s legal right.

Evidence

The Scene

The scene of this incident is a residential property on a rural route located approximately 34 kilometres south west of Hawkesbury and approximately six kilometres north east of Saint Isidore, Ontario.

The property contains a two story house which is approximately 170 feet south of the roadway. There are a few outbuildings located on the property, the largest outbuilding being a garage located approximately 90 feet south of the house.

The garage is a single story building measuring approximately 19 feet by 30 feet. There is a roll up overhead garage door on the east side of the garage as well as a window. There is a solid aluminum person door, with no window, on the north side of the garage. The person door faces the house. There is also a window on the west side of the garage. The two garage windows were loosely covered by a black felt landscaping material.

The Armored Rescue Vehicle (ARV) used by the OPP Tactical Rescue Unit (TRU) team to approach the Complainant’s garage was on scene and in its final resting position. Two spent distraction devices were located on the ground on the driver’s side of the ARV. The remote controlled vehicle that was used to view the inside of the garage was in its final position on the floor beside the Complainant. The scene was photographed and a scene diagram completed.

After the Coroner had examined the Complainant, the rope used by the Complainant, and more specifically the ligature, were seized by the SIU for presentation to the pathologist at the autopsy. During a search of the garage a five page note written in French was located on a table.

Also of interest was that a 30.06 bolt action rifle was located on a shelf in the garage. The rifle was in a black hard plastic case with a trigger lock installed. There were no 30.06 projectiles located inside the garage.

Post Mortem Report

On Saturday, May 14, 2016, at 9:15 a.m., the SIU Forensic Investigators attended the post- mortem examination of the Complainant.

On November 2, 2016, the SIU received a copy of the post-mortem report, which provided a summary and opinion that indicated the Complainant’s death was due to hanging. The report also indicated that there was a ligature mark on the neck with a left posterior suspension point. The features are those of a self-suspension hanging. Apart from the ligature mark, there were only minor injuries on the legs.

Materials obtained from Police Service

Upon request, the SIU obtained and reviewed the following materials and documents from the OPP Hawkesbury Detachment; Lanark County Detachment; Loyalist Detachment (Odessa); and Rockland Detachment (Russell County):

  • dvent details report,
  • list of involved officers,
  • notes for WO #1, WO #2, WO #3, WO #4, WO #5, WO #6, WO #7, WO #8 aand WO #9,
  • notes for nine additional officers; and
  • Transport Canada unmanned air vehicle operation certificate.

Incident narrative

In the early morning hours of May 13, 2016, the CW woke up to find the Complainant in the detached garage of their residence, with the windows covered. Once she realized that he also had a firearm, she left the residence with her children and called 911, advising that the Complainant had locked himself in the garage with a rifle. A short time later, the Complainant sent the CW a message through a mutual friend that the children were not to go into the garage, although she could.

OPP officers responded and began an operation that involved the East Region Emergency Response Team (ERT) and the Provincial TRU being mobilized. SO #1 and SO #2 took command of the incident. Repeated attempts were made to contact the Complainant inside the garage, both on scene and by telephone and text, but to no avail.

Eventually, the door to the garage was breached and the Complainant was found hanging inside. He was already deceased. A five page note addressed to the CW and the children was also located inside the garage.

Relevant legislation

Section 219, Criminal Code - Criminal Negligence

(1) Every one is criminally negligent who

(a) in doing anything, or

(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,

shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.

(2) For the purposes of this section, duty means a duty imposed by law.

Section 220, Criminal Code - Causing Death by Criminal Negligence

Every person who by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable

  • where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and
  • in any other case, to imprisonment for life.

Analysis and director’s decision

On May 13th, 2016, at approximately 4:00 a.m., the Complainant left his residence and made his way to his garage. At 6:00 a.m., the CW went outside to the garage and took note of the fact that the Complainant had covered the windows of the garage. The CW enquired what he was doing and he responded that he was thinking. The CW returned to the house and discovered that a rifle was missing from the bedroom. Consequently, the CW left the residence with her children. At approximately 6:38 a.m., the CW called 911 to report that she believed her husband was in trouble and had locked himself in the garage with a firearm. At 12:32 p.m., OPP officers entered the garage and found the Complainant deceased and hanging suspended by a rope. The presence of a five page suicide note as well as the post-mortem report confirmed that the Complainant committed suicide.

The communications log confirms that a call was received by the OPP Communications Centre at 6:38:42 a.m. wherein the female caller advised that her husband had locked himself in the garage and had a rifle with him; the call lasted until 6:45:08 a.m. Shortly thereafter, WO #2 met with the CW. WO #2, in his statement, advised that he had originally been en route to the residence, when he was redirected by WO #1 to go and meet with the CW. Over the course of the morning, WO #2 remained with the CW, obtaining details from her about the Complainant leading to this situation and forwarding those details on to officers involved in the incident. At 7:28 a.m., the Complainant apparently messaged a mutual friend on Facebook advising her to instruct the CW not to let the children into the garage, but that the CW herself could easily enter. WO #2 advised that this message was texted to the CW, from the mutual friend, and was received at 7:55 a.m.

Although the two officers who were heading up this occurrence, SO #1 and SO #2, declined to be interviewed by SIU investigators, as is their legal right, based on the statements of all officers deployed during this occurrence as well as the Communications log and the Event Details Log, the factual sequence of events is fairly clear, as follows:

Immediately after 6:45 a.m., WO #2 responded to the 911 call and made his way towards the Complainant’s residence when he was rerouted by WO #1.

As soon as WO #1 became aware of the 911 call and that WO #2 was en route, he directed WO #2 to meet with the CW to obtain more details and, as soon as the day shift officers, who were just arriving at that point, came on shift, he instructed them to set up a containment area surrounding the residence and to block all traffic on the roadway.

WO #1 was then advised by WO #3 that he had called in the OPP’s ERT.

At approximately 7:00 a.m., WO #4 was directed by WO #1 to drive out to the residence in an unmarked vehicle and photograph the buildings, which he then did and reported back to WO #1.

At 7:18 a.m., WO #1 received information from WO #2 about the background information he had received from the CW regarding the situation leading up to the Complainant’s going into the garage.

At 7:29 a.m., WO #7 was called out to the residence, where he was detailed to drive the OPP’s ARV.

At approximately 7:30 a.m., WO #5 and WO #6, who were stationed in Odessa, were directed by SO #1 to attend at the residence, and they immediately left Odessa.

At 7:38 a.m., WO #1 was advised of the Facebook message posted by the Complainant to the CW about whether or not the insurance policies were up to date. WO #1 then attended the command post that had been set up near the residence.

WO #8, an ERT member from Perth Detachment, was directed by WO #3 to attend the residence and to bring the OPP Unmanned Aerial System (UAS, also known as a drone) with him.

WO #9, a crisis negotiator with the OPP, was instructed to gear up and head to the residence, arriving at 8:42 a.m., where she was briefed by an officer on scene and, over the phone, by WO #2 and the CW.

At 10:15 a.m., WO #9 attempted to contact the Complainant by phone, but was unsuccessful. A second attempt was made at 10:25 a.m., again without response.

At 10:30 a.m., WO #9 attempted to contact the Complainant through his work number and left a voice message.

At 10:30 a.m., WO #5 and WO #6 arrived at the command post from Odessa where they met with the Critical Incident Commander, SO #2, and were updated on all available information.

At approximately 10:35 a.m., WO #8 arrived at the command post from Perth and deployed the UAS over the Complainant‘s property, obtaining photographs and video, which was then provided to SO #2. WO #8 then loaded the UAS into his vehicle and drove closer to the property and deployed the drone a second time attempting to obtain images from inside the garage; he could not, however, see very far inside the garage. He was asked to orbit the UAS over the property while other OPP officers were deploying to the garage area, but had difficulty maintaining level flight due to windy conditions and had to bring the UAS back and then redeploy it a third time.

At 10:40 a.m., WO #9 sent a text message to the Complainant identifying herself and advising that she would like to speak with him and providing a number where she could be reached, but again there was no response. WO #9 continued with attempts to contact the Complainant in order to enter into negotiations, but all were unsuccessful.

Shortly after 11:28 a.m., WO #9 entered the ARV with tactical officers and approached the Complainant’s garage, where WO #9 used a loud hailer to attempt to contact the Complainant, without any response.

At 12:00 p.m., SO #1 arrived at the command post and took over control of the OPP TRU members. SO #1 directed WO #5 and WO #6 to get ready to deploy to the garage area.

At 12:15 p.m., WO #5 and WO #6 ran up the side laneway and entered the ARV where WO #5 prepared the OPP remote control track robot for deployment. WO #5 and WO #6 then exited the ARV and WO #6 breached the garage door. WO #5 threw the remote robot onto the concrete floor of the garage and observed, via the robot’s transmissions, that the Complainant was hanging inside the garage and that he was not moving. Officers then gained entry into the garage as did a paramedic, who confirmed that the Complainant was deceased.

Given the length of time it took to enter the garage, knowing that the Complainant was potentially suicidal, the criminal offence that arises for consideration in this case is criminal negligence causing death. As a crime of penal negligence the impugned conduct must be predicated on a finding that there has been a marked departure from the objective standard of the reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. (R. v Creighton [1993] 3 SCR 3). Additionally, the conduct must constitute a wanton or reckless disregard for the life or safety of others (R. v F.(J.) [2008] 3 SCR 215). The courts have consistently held that the requisite “reckless” component of the offence means carelessness for the consequences of the action or omission so far as the lives and safety of others. The “wanton” requisite differs from “reckless” only in that it includes the idea not only of indifference to consequences, but of an unrestrained disregard for consequences (R. v Rogers [1968] 4 CRNS 303 (BCCA); R. v Pinske [1988] CanLII 176 (BCCA); R. v Walker (1974) 18 CCC (2d) 179 (NSCA)).

The departure from the norm must be marked in both physical and mental aspects of the behaviour. On the physical side, the conduct itself must be a marked and substantial departure from that which an ordinarily prudent person would undertake. The mental element is not met merely by showing that a reasonable person would have recognized there existed a risk of injury. In order to be wanton and reckless, the consequences must be much more obvious. (R. v. J.L., [2006] O.J. No 131 (C.A.) at para. 14-21).

It is clear, on a review of all of the evidence, that the Complainant was intent on taking his own life and had planned and taken all steps to carry out his intention, from writing a five page suicide note for his loved ones, to taking his firearm with him and obscuring the view inside of the garage by covering the windows. We cannot know what the Complainant’s intentions were when he took the firearm with him into the garage but the senior officers tasked with commanding a team of police officers to bring this incident to an end could not take a risk that the Complainant may have either wanted to engage police in a fire fight or end the lives of others when he ended his own.

In this case, the Complainant’s actions engaged the OPP policy entitled Barricaded Suspect/Hostage Incident Guidelines, which dictate that a Critical Incident Commander will be involved and that TRU, ERT, Crisis Negotiators, canine officers and the Technical Support Section will be activated in such circumstances. The policy makes clear that officers’ personal safety is paramount and they should plan and approach the situation safely. The policy was fully complied with, which in this case took a significant amount of time.

However, given the circumstances known to the officers and due to the location of the Hawkesbury Detachment near the Ontario/Quebec border, and the plan’s reliance on manpower and equipment from both the Perth and Odessa Detachments in a critical incident, it is clear that an incident of this nature could not safely be resolved without a significant passage of time in order to ensure that all personnel and equipment were present and able to assist. It is unfortunate, that in order to take advantage of the experience and training of the TRU team, it required them to travel in excess of 267 kilometres to attend the scene, requiring a delay of some two plus hours. Similarly, in order for the Hawkesbury Detachment to utilize the UAS, it had to be transported from Perth, some 175 kilometres from Hawkesbury.

It may well be that WO #2, who responded by driving towards the residence immediately upon becoming aware of the 911 call from the CW, could have prevented the suicide of the Complainant if he had immediately attended the Complainant’s home, which had been his initial plan until he was directed to attend on the CW. On the other hand, WO #2 could have himself been killed or been involved in killing the Complainant. With the information provided by the CW, that the Complainant was in possession of a firearm, it would have been foolhardy to rush in without taking the proper precautions. It is not unusual, unfortunately, for suicidal persons to resort to what has been euphemistically referred to as “suicide by cop” and it was incumbent on the officers tasked with overseeing this critical incident to ensure not only the safety of the public, including the Complainant, if possible, but to also ensure that the officers under their command take every precaution to ensure their own safety.

It is clear that the Complainant took his own life without any intervention by police. It would be speculative to assume that, had police acted with less caution and more quickly[1], his life could have been saved at the risk of the loss of other human life. The OPP commanders tasked with directing this incident followed all procedures as set out in their policy guidelines and cannot be held responsible for the Complainant’s actions in fulfilling his intention to end his own life. As such, ultimately in all the circumstances it cannot be said that the subject officers’ failure to act more quickly was a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person let alone constituted conduct that amounted to a wanton and reckless disregard for the Complainant’s life. As a result, there are no reasonable grounds here for the laying of criminal charges and no charges will issue.

Date: August 10, 2017

Original signed by
Tony Loparco
Director
Special Investigations Unit

Endnotes

  • 1) [1] And thereby ignoring their own policy. [Back to text]

Note:

The signed English original report is authoritative, and any discrepancy between that report and the French and English online versions should be resolved in favour of the original English report.