SIU Director’s Report - Case # 16-PVI-099

Warning:

This page contains graphic content that can shock, offend and upset.

Mandate of the SIU

The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving police officers where there has been death, serious injury or allegations of sexual assault. The Unit’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.

Under the Police Services Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether an officer has committed a criminal offence in connection with the incident under investigation. If, after an investigation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the officer. Alternatively, in all cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director does not lay criminal charges but files a report with the Attorney General communicating the results of an investigation.

Information restrictions

Freedom of Information and Protection of Personal Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)

Pursuant to section 14 of FIPPA (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

  • Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and
  • Information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding.

Pursuant to section 21 of FIPPA (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this document. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

  • subject officer name(s)
  • witness officer name(s)
  • civilian witness name(s)
  • location information
  • witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence and
  • other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation

Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (“PHIPA”)

Pursuant to PHIPA, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may have also been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

Mandate engaged

The Unit’s investigative jurisdiction is limited to those incidents where there is a serious injury (including sexual assault allegations) or death in cases involving the police.

“Serious injuries” shall include those that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. “Serious Injury” shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide on the extent of its involvement.

This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the serious injuries suffered by a 35-year-old male and a 4-year-old child during a single motor vehicle collision occurring while being followed by officers.

The investigation

Notification of the SIU

The SIU was notified of the incident by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) on April 18, 2016 at 11:20 a.m. The OPP reported that earlier in the morning, an Amber Alert involving a parental abduction had been issued by York Regional Police (YRP). At approximately 8:52 a.m., members of the Bancroft OPP detachment attempted to stop a vehicle matching one that was believed to be driven by the suspect in the abduction, being Complainant #1. Complainant #1 ignored the OPP and sped away. A pursuit ensued but was called off due to the dangerous driving exhibited by Complainant #1. Area detachments were made aware of Complainant #1, and he was tracked as he continued driving in a dangerous manner northbound on Highway 41. At approximately 9:50 a.m., Complainant #1 reached Paul Martin Drive in Pembroke, where he failed to negotiate a curve, lost control and rolled over. Complainant #1 was arrested at the scene, and his four year old daughter (Complainant #2), who was in a rear seat, was extricated from the vehicle. The child was later airlifted to the hospital where she was treated for spinal injuries. Complainant #1 was diagnosed with a fractured sternum and a spinal injury.

The team

Number of SIU Investigators assigned: 5

Number of SIU Forensic Investigators assigned: 2

Complainants

Complainant# 1 35-year-old male interviewed, medical records obtained and reviewed

Complainant# 2 4-year-old child, not interviewed, medical records obtained and reviewed

Civilian witnesses

CW #1 Interviewed

CW #2 Interviewed

CW #3 Interviewed

CW #4 Interviewed

CW #5 Interviewed

CW #6 Interviewed

CW #7 Interviewed

CW #8 Interviewed

CW #9 Interviewed

CW #10 Interviewed

CW #11 Interviewed

CW #12 Interviewed

CW #13 Interviewed

CW #14 Interviewed

CW #15 Interviewed

CW #16 Interviewed

CW #17 Interviewed

Witness officers

WO #1 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #2 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #3 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #4 Interviewed

WO #5 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #6 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #7 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #8 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #9 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #10 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #11 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #12 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #13 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #14 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #15 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #16 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #17 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #18 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #19 Interviewed

WO #20 Interviewed

WO #21 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #22 Interviewed

WO #23 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #24 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #25 Interviewed

WO #26 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #27 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #28 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #29 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #30 Interviewed

WO #31 Not interviewed, but notes received and reviewed

WO #32 Interviewed

WO #33 Interviewed

WO #34 Interviewed

Subject officers

SO Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

Evidence

The scene

Scene diagram

OPP reconstructionist report

The Toyota van was northbound on Paul Martin Drive when it entered into a left hand curve at a high rate of speed. As it proceeded through the curve the van exceeded the available traction force and entered into a ‘yaw’ movement. As the van continued through the curve the vehicle began to side slip, leaving the scuff marks on the roadway and the rear tires to out-track the front tires. The scuffs left by the right side tires were darker in colour, indicating that there was increased loading on the right. As the vehicle left the roadway it created furrows in the gravel shoulder, throwing dirt in an easterly direction. The van traveled into the ditch, struck two metal sign posts, leaving scrapes and scuffs on the post. The sign that had been attached to the top was thrown in a northerly direction. After striking the sign, the right front tire experienced increased loading and began to dig into the earth, leaving a furrow in the sod.

The onset of the right side roll experienced by the van caused a load transfer to the right side tires. This was evidenced by the right side tires furrowing deep into the soft ground. As the van rolled onto its right side it created an area of scraped earth. This resulted in grass and dirt becoming embedded in the voids and cracks on the right side of the van.

The pre-crash data from the event data recorder (EDR) indicated that the van was traveling at a minimum 126 km/h; this is the upper recording limit of the EDR Yaw calculations and corroborated the speed recorded with a calculated speed of 119 km/h near the beginning of the Yaw.

The posted speed limit for that area was 50 km/h. The critical curve speed for the roadway was approximately 87 km/h. At the speed the van was traveling it was impossible for it to negotiate the left hand curve. This resulted in the van leaving the roadway and rolling over.

Time and distance

Based on calculations from the time and distance formula, Complainant #1’s average speed during the protracted pursuit was 148 km/h.

Diagram - driving route

Upon request, the SIU obtained and reviewed the following materials and documents from the involved OPP detachments: Bancroft Detachment; Frontenac Detachment; Haliburton Highlands Detachment; Killaloe Detachment; Napanee Detachment; Ottawa Detachment; Provincial Communications Centre (Smith Falls); Renfrew Detachment (Renfrew Country); and Upper Ottawa Valley Detachment:

  • Detachment Logon Sheet
  • Event Chronology (Multiple)
  • Map of complainant’s route (Bancroft to Pembroke)
  • Motor Vehicle Collision Report
  • Notes of WO #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #13, #14, #15, 16, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21, #22, #23, #24, #25, #26, #27, #28, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #34, and
  • Several Occurrence Details

Incident narrative

In the early morning hours of April 18, 2016, YRP issued an Amber Alert, alleging that Complainant #1 had abducted his four year old daughter, Complainant #2, from her home in Aurora. Descriptions of Complainant #1, Complainant #2 and the Toyota van being used were broadcast through the Amber Alert system.

At approximately 7:30 a.m., YRP was notified after Complainant #1 used a bank card to withdraw money from a bank located in Haliburton. YRP notified the OPP to be on the lookout for Complainant #1, who was believed to be in cottage country. At approximately 8:53 a.m., the SO and WO #4 saw a van matching Complainant #1’s van being driven erratically in Bancroft. The pair attempted to stop Complainant #1, who sped away eastbound on Highway 28, precipitating a short pursuit. At 9:02 a.m., WO #33 instructed the SO to discontinue the pursuit, due to Complainant #1’s dangerous driving and the risk to Complainant #2.

In the next hour, several civilian witnesses called 911 to report Complainant #1’s erratic driving. OPP officers followed some distance behind the van to Paul Martin Drive in Pembroke, where Complainant #1 failed to negotiate a curve and rolled his van.

WO #20 arrived on scene and assisted in stabilizing Complainant #2 until paramedics arrived. She was then removed from the rear of the van. WO # 20 accompanied Complainant # 2 when she was airlifted to another hospital. Complainant # 2 sustained compressions of the third and fifth vertebrae. WO # 19 and WO #22 attended the scene of the collision and found Complainant #1 unconscious and dangling from his seatbelt. WO #22 ordered an ambulance and the fire department to attend. Complainant #1 regained consciousness and struggled to get out of the van. WO #19 searched Complainant #1 for weapons and then released him from the vehicle. Complainant #1 struggled to his feet and was arrested. WO #19 accompanied Complainant #1 to the hospital, where it was determined that he had sustained an upper sternal fracture and compression fracture of the 8th vertebrae.

In total, from the first involvement of the SO to the location of the accident, Complainant #1 had driven more than 140 kilometres over a period of one hour and seven minutes.

Chronology of events

8:33 a.m.:
YRP notify the OPP that Complainant #1, who they are seeking for the abduction of Complainant #2, used his bank card in Haliburton at approximately 7:37 a.m.
8:37 a.m.:
The OPP broadcast a message in the area of Haliburton for units to be on the lookout for Complainant #1 and Complainant #2, who are believed to be in silver Toyota van.
8:52 a.m.:
WO #4, a passenger in a cruiser operated by the SO, reported that they were following the wanted vehicle on the outskirts of Bancroft.
8:54 a.m.:
WO #4 reported that Complainant #1 appeared to be stopping. A few seconds later, Complainant #1 sped away and WO #4 reported that she had lost sight of the vehicle as it sped eastbound on Highway 28.
9:08 a.m.:
WO #33, the supervisor at the communication centre, reported that a helicopter was being readied to takeoff from Orillia to track Complainant #1.
9:08 a.m.:
WO #33 ordered that spike belts were not to be deployed due to the belief that Complainant #2 was believed to be in the van.
9:17 a.m.:
WO #32 broadcast that he was following Complainant #1, who was travelling eastbound on Highway 28, near the hamlet of Denbigh. WO #32 reported that he had not activated his emergency equipment.
9:19 a.m.:
WO #32 advised that he was backing off the pursuit and was travelling at 130 km/h.
9:20 a.m.:
WO #32 reported that due to topography, he could only see Complainant #1’s vehicle sporadically.
9:22 a.m.:
WO #32 reported that he had lost sight of Complainant #1’s vehicle.
9:23 a.m.:
WO #32 opined that Complainant #1 had either gone southbound or northbound on Highway 41.
9:32 a.m.:
WO #25, travelling southbound on Highway 41, reported he had clocked Complainant #1, who had been travelling northbound on Highway 41 toward Highway 132, at 178 km/h.
9:36 a.m.:
WO #33 repeated spike belts were not to be deployed, and Complainant #1 was not to be pursued, but rather that the units should report any sighting(s) of the wanted vehicle. A helicopter was on the way.
9:44 a.m.:
Complainant #1 was reported speeding westbound on Bonnechere Street (Highway 41) in the town of Eganville.
9:50 a.m.:
Complainant #1 was reported northbound on Highway 41, travelling toward the hamlet of Rankin.
9:51 a.m.:
WO #20, southbound on Highway 41, reported he had clocked Complainant #1, who was travelling northbound on Highway 41 at Green Lake Road, at 178 km/h.
9:51 a.m.:
Complainant #1 was reported passing Beeline Road on Highway 41.
9:55 a.m.:
WO #22 reported that he and WO #19 had blocked all eastbound and westbound traffic on Highway 17, at the intersection of Highway 41.
9:58 a.m.:
It was reported that Complainant #1 passed through the intersection of Highway 17 and Highway 41, and was speeding northbound on Paul Martin Drive (Highway 41).
9:59:35 a.m.:
A report of a rolled vehicle at the Pemco Steel Plant situated on Paul Martin Drive. An ambulance was summoned.

Analysis and Director’s decision

On Monday April 18th, 2016, an Amber Alert was issued after CW #1 called 911 alleging that Complainant #1 had abducted her daughter (Complainant #2) from their home in Aurora and driven off in a Toyota van. At approximately 9:59 a.m., the Toyota van, after having travelled over 350 kilometres from where the abduction occurred, failed to negotiate a curve in front of the Pemco Steel plant situated at 555 Paul Martin Drive in the City of Pembroke and rolled over, landing on its roof in a ditch after snapping two steel poles and shearing off a small tree. Complainant #1 sustained an upper sternal fracture and a compression fracture of the eighth vertebrae, while Complainant #2 sustained compressions of the third and fifth vertebrae.

During the course of the investigation by the SIU into whether or not there was a causal connection between the actions of police and the collision that led to the injuries sustained by Complainant #1 and Complainant #2, seventeen civilian witnesses and ten police witnesses, including the SO, of the Ontario OPP, were interviewed while an additional 25 officers from nine separate OPP Detachments provided their notes to investigators for review. The facts are not in dispute, and all the witnesses confirmed that no police pursuit was involved in the collision. Rather, Complainant #1 was consistently observed to be travelling at excessive and dangerous speeds, that his driving was reckless, that he disobeyed numerous traffic signals, drove on the wrong side of the road, and generally committed all manner of Highway Traffic Act offences, despite the fact that for the most part, he was not being pursued by police.

The SO advised that he became aware of the Amber Alert issued by YRP with respect to the abduction of Complainant #2, as a result of which he and WO #4 decided to patrol Highway 28 for the wanted van. The SO advised investigators that he observed a speeding van travelling on Highway 28, in the opposite direction, shortly after he left the detachment. The SO, after the van had passed, immediately made a U-turn to follow the van. The SO observed the van travelling at a high rate of speed and accelerated to close the gap. Shortly thereafter, he activated his emergency lighting to initiate a traffic stop whereupon the van initially slowed as if to stop, but then accelerated and sped off. The SO pursued the van and observed Complainant #1 disobey a red signal light and continue to travel on Highway 28 at a high rate of speed. The SO stated that during this pursuit, his speed fluctuated between 130 – 150 km/h but he never managed to close the gap between his cruiser and Complainant #1, who he estimated was driving up to 160 km/h. The SO advised that he briefly lost sight of the van due to traffic, but again spotted the vehicle once on the outskirts of Bancroft. The SO observed the van first behind and then in front of a propane truck and he then again lost sight of the complainant’s vehicle. At that point, the communication centre instructed the SO to pull over and stop. WO #4 requested permission to follow the van and that permission was granted and SO #1 and WO #4 continued to monitor the radio transmissions and thereby follow the route of Complainant #1, but at no point did they again spot the van after their initial interaction approximately nine kilometres east of Bancroft. From the point where the SO disengaged in his pursuit, to the point where Complainant #1 eventually crashed his motor vehicle, is a distance of approximately 130 kilometres, which Complainant #1 continued to travel at high rates of speed and in a dangerous manner.

WO #4, in her statement to investigators, corroborated the statement of the SO, with a number of additions. She advised that she was able to confirm that the vehicle was indeed the van described in the Amber Alert and advised that the SO managed to pull directly behind the van at one point when Complainant #1 swerved into oncoming traffic and then pulled back into the proper lane. She advised that she then activated the emergency lighting and Complainant #1 slowed and pulled over as if to stop, but then suddenly accelerated away. WO #4 advised that she then deactivated the emergency lighting and they lost sight of the van for a period of time and when they spotted it again, it was a long distance ahead of them. At the point where she observed the van to pass the propane truck in a dangerous manner, she contacted the communications centre and was directed by WO #33, the communication sergeant, to disengage and pull over; which the SO did. She requested and was granted permission to follow in the same direction that the van was moving, but at no time did she actually see the van again and she and the SO did not go to the collision scene.

WO #25 advised that he spotted the van while he was driving southbound on Highway 41 toward Griffith and he was able to clock the speed of the vehicle on his dash mounted radar device as travelling at 178 km/h. He advised that he made a U-turn after the van had passed him, but he was aware of the ‘do not pursue” directive and as such, he only notified the communications centre of the location and direction of travel of the van, but did not himself ever see the van again.

WO #33, who was the sergeant in the communications centre on April 18th, 2016, advised that his role was to monitor all calls for service. WO #33 had apparently just completed a suspect pursuit training session where it was stressed that unpredictable drivers should be given space to de-escalate the situation. WO #33 was of the view that Complainant #1 might be unpredictable if police tried to stop him and as soon as he learned that Complainant #1 had refused to stop for WO #4, he instructed the dispatcher to advise the SO and WO #4 to pull over and stop, in order to give Complainant #1 space. WO #33 advised that he did not wish to stop the van, but only to monitor it; as such, WO #33 issued the order that no spike belts were to be deployed and that there was to be no pursuit. With every police sighting of the van, WO #33 reiterated that there was to be no pursuit, but police were to follow and to give him room.

WO #32, in his statement, advised that he came across Complainant #1’s van at approximately 9:20 a.m. when it sped past him going in the opposite direction just west of Denbigh. WO #32 made a U-turn and accelerated after the van. It took him about 30 seconds to close the gap between himself and the van, which was travelling at approximately 130 km/h. WO #32 advised that he came within 15 to 20 metres of the van when he notified the communications centre that he was following, but had not activated his emergency equipment. WO #32 indicated that he was aware of the “do not pursue” directive and when the van accelerated to 180 km/h, he backed off and advised the communications centre of same.

WO #19 was directed to take up a position at the busy intersection of Highways 17 and 41 with WO #22 and they were to stop all eastbound and westbound traffic. WO #19 observed the suspect van travelling northbound through the intersection at approximately 160 km/h, almost losing control in the intersection, veering to the left almost going into the ditch at which point the driver regained control and sped northbound on Paul Martin Drive and disappeared from sight. WO #19 returned to her cruiser and turned onto Paul Martin Drive when she was advised that the van had rolled over further north, and she attended that location. The evidence of WO #19 is corroborated by WO #22, who again reiterated that he was aware of the command from WO #33, the communication supervisor, that they were not to pursue the vehicle. WO #22 advised that he observed the van pass through the intersection of Highways 17 and 41 at an estimated speed of 160 km/h. WO #22 got back into his vehicle to follow, but quickly lost sight of the van. He then heard that there had been a collision and made his way to the site.

WO #20 was driving to the Hamlet of Rankin, when he observed Complainant #1 pass him in the opposite direction, registering a speed of 178 km/h on his dash mounted radar. WO #20 was aware of the “do not pursue” order and that no spike belts were to be deployed. He made a U-turn behind Complainant #1’s vehicle and notified the communication centre of his observations and the location of the van. He advised that he neither pursued the van nor activated his emergency equipment. WO #20 continued to receive reports of the progress of the van and when he heard that it had been involved in a collision, he quickly made his way to the scene. He was the first officer to arrive.

On a review of all of the evidence, it is clear that immediately following the initial pursuit by the SO in the Bancroft area, WO #33 issued an order that no police vehicles were to engage in a pursuit of Complainant #1 in his motor vehicle. The issuance of this directive, and the fact that it was scrupulously followed, is confirmed by the officers who observed Complainant #1 driving his motor vehicle in a dangerous manner at high rates of speed at various points over a route of more than 140 kilometres and verified that no police vehicle was in pursuit. It was, of course, incumbent upon police to follow and advise as to the location of Complainant #1 and Complainant #2, whom he had abducted, but it is clear on all of the evidence that Complainant #1 was not aware that police were following at a discreet distance and his dangerous driving was not fuelled by any police pursuit.

Additionally, I find that the SO’s actions in initially engaging Complainant #1 in a pursuit were justifiable in the circumstances. The SO was in possession of information that Complainant #1 had abducted Complainant #2 who was in all likelihood in the vehicle which Complainant # 1 was driving at extremely high rates of speed and in a reckless manner. As such, there was some urgency to stop Complainant #1 and rescue Complainant #2. However, once it became clear that Complainant #1 was not going to stop for police, the communication centre was notified and the directive to discontinue any pursuit and to pull over and stop was strictly adhered to. I can find no causal connection between a pursuit of short lived duration for a lawful purpose which was terminated as soon as it became clear that Complainant #1 would not comply with police commands to pull over and a collision that occurred some 130 kilometres away with no police interaction with Complainant #1 in the intervening hour.

I am satisfied on this record that the SO was acting lawfully when he first attempted to stop the Toyota van in order to bring an abduction to an end and that his conduct thereafter fell within the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law. Accordingly, there are no grounds for proceeding with charges against this officer.

Date: August 17, 2017

Original signed by

Tony Loparco Director Special Investigations Unit

Note:

The signed English original report is authoritative, and any discrepancy between that report and the French and English online versions should be resolved in favour of the original English report.