Director's Report Details

The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving police officers where there has been death, serious injury or allegations of sexual assault. The Unit’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.

Under the Police Services Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether an officer has committed a criminal offence in connection with the incident under investigation. If, after an investigation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the officer. Alternatively, in all cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director does not lay criminal charges but files a report with the Attorney General communicating the results of an investigation.

Freedom of Information and Protection of Personal Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)

Pursuant to section 14 of FIPPA (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

• Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and
• Information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding.

Pursuant to section 21 of FIPPA (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this document. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

• subject officer name(s)
• witness officer name(s)
• civilian witness name(s)
• location information
• witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence and
• other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation

Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (“PHIPA”)

Pursuant to PHIPA, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may have also been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

The Unit’s investigative jurisdiction is limited to those incidents where there is a serious injury (including sexual assault allegations) or death in cases involving the police.

“Serious injuries” shall include those that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. “Serious Injury” shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide on the extent of its involvement.

This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the death of a 65-year-old woman and the serious injury reportedly sustained by a 20-year-old man during a police pursuit on September 25, 2017.

Notification of the SIU

At approximately 5:00 p.m. on September 25, 2017, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) contacted the SIU to report that earlier that day, at about 4:00 p.m., OPP officers from the Arnprior Detachment[1] attempted to stop the driver of a vehicle who was driving erratically and at a high rate of speed. OPP officers attempted to conduct a rolling block manoeuvre and deploy a spike belt.

The driver of the vehicle being operated in a dangerous manner was travelling in the area of Daniel Street South in the Town of Arnprior, when his vehicle crossed the centre line and collided head-on with an on-coming vehicle[2]. The female driver of the vehicle involved in the head-on collision was killed. The driver, who had been driving erratically, was airlifted to the hospital with unknown injuries.

The scene was held by the OPP.

The Team

Number of SIU Investigators assigned: 7

Number of SIU Forensic Investigators assigned: 2

Number of SIU Collision Reconstructionist assigned: 1

The SIU dispatched six investigators, two forensic identification investigators, and a collision reconstructionist to investigate this incident.

The SIU agreed to share the scene with the OPP, which had a serious multi-vehicle incident to investigate.

SIU forensic investigators completed a scene examination, took photographs of the scene and measured the scene using a Total Station device for forensic mapping purposes.

An SIU Reconstructionist conducted his own investigation related to the collision.

The deceased was removed from her vehicle by the Fire Department and she was transported to the hospital morgue.

On September 27, 2017, an SIU forensic investigator attended the post-mortem examination of the deceased.

SIU forensic investigators and an SIU reconstructionist attended vehicle examinations of the Ford pick-up truck, the Chevrolet and the involved OPP vehicles.

The scene and pursuit route were video recorded by SIU forensic investigators.

SIU investigators canvassed the pursuit route for witnesses and closed-circuit television video (CCTV).

At a later date, the Total Station was used to obtain measurements on Daniel Street South at the Canadian Tire, Home Hardware, Tim Hortons, and Mr. Gas for time, distance and speed calculations to determine the average speeds of the involved vehicles; the four locations were also photographed.

Complainants:

Complainant #1 65-year-old female, deceased

Complainant #2 Declined to be interviewed, medical records obtained and reviewed.

Civilian Witnesses

CW #1 Not interviewed (next-of-kin of Complainant #1)

CW #2 Not interviewed (next-of-kin of Complainant #1)

CW #3 Not interviewed (next-of-kin of Complainant #2)

CW #4 Interviewed

CW #5 Interviewed

CW #6 Interviewed

CW #7 Interviewed

CW #8 Interviewed

CW #9 Interviewed

CW #10 Interviewed

CW #11 Interviewed

CW #12 Interviewed

CW #13 Interviewed

CW #14 Interviewed

CW #15 Interviewed

CW #16 Interviewed

CW #17 Interviewed

CW #18 Interviewed

CW #19 Interviewed

CW #20 Interviewed

CW #21 Interviewed

CW #22 Interviewed

CW #23 Interviewed

CW #24 Interviewed

CW #25 Interviewed

CW #26 Interviewed

CW #27 Interviewed

CW #28 Interviewed

CW #29 Interviewed

CW #30 Interviewed

CW #31 Interviewed

CW #32 Interviewed

CW #33 Interviewed

CW #34 Interviewed

CW #35 Interviewed

CW #36 Interviewed

CW #37 Interviewed

CW #38 Interviewed

CW #39 Interviewed

CW #40 Provided written statement, did not witness police pursuit, interview deemed not necessary

CW #41 Interviewed

CW #42 911 caller, did not witness police pursuit, interview deemed not necessary

CW #43 Did not witness police pursuit, interview deemed not necessary

CW #44 Did not witness police pursuit, interview deemed not necessary

CW #45 Interviewed

CW #46 Interviewed

CW #47 Interviewed

CW #48 Interviewed

CW #49 Interviewed

CW #50 Interviewed

Witness Officers

WO #1 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #2 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #3 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #4 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #5 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #6 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #7 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #8 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #9 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

WO #10 Interviewed, notes received and reviewed

Subject Officers

SO #1 Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject officer’s legal right

SO #2 Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject officer’s legal right

SO #3 Declined interview and to provide notes, as is the subject officer’s legal right

On September 25, 2017, sometime before 3:00 in the afternoon, Complainant #2 stole a Ford pick-up truck that was parked in an unoccupied lot at the Eganville Community Arena in the Township of Eganville in the County of Renfrew.

At 3:15 p.m., the owner of the pick-up truck contacted the OPP and reported that his truck had been stolen.

Even before the owner had reported the theft of his motor vehicle, as of 2:59 p.m., numerous 911 calls began to come in to the 911 communications centre. The calls were from a number of concerned citizens reporting the driver of a pick-up truck driving erratically, at high rates of speed, in the wrong lane of traffic, cutting off drivers on the road, and in one case, sideswiping the entire passenger side of an SUV.

Several OPP officers responded to the call for the driver in the pick-up truck, while an additional OPP officer responded to the complaint of the vehicle owner regarding the theft of his motor vehicle.

WO #3, who was operating an unmarked police pick-up truck, with no emergency equipment, spotted the pick-up truck travelling eastbound on Hwy 17 at Lochwinnoch Road, and she alerted OPP officers over the radio as to the location of the vehicle. WO #3 followed the pick-up truck eastbound on Hwy 17 and confirmed that the licence plate on the truck matched the licence plate of the pick-up truck that was reported stolen in Eganville.

Three OPP officers, the three subject officers, travelling in three separate police vehicles, two marked police cruisers and one unmarked police vehicle, took over following the truck from WO #3, as her vehicle was not equipped to stop the motor vehicle as she was without lights or sirens. The OPP officers attempted to stop the driver of the pick-up truck by conducting a rolling block manoeuvre using their police vehicles and a spike belt was prepared for deployment, but they were unsuccessful.

The driver of the pick-up truck exited Hwy 17 at the White Lake Road exit in the Town of Arnprior and travelled northeast on Daniel Street South, where he struck the motor vehicle being operated by Complainant #1 at a high rate of speed, in the oncoming lane of traffic at Edey Street, and completely destroyed Complainant #1’s motor vehicle, trapping her inside.

Complainant #2, who was identified as the driver of the stolen pick-up truck, was transported to the hospital with serious injuries.

The actions of the three OPP officers travelling directly behind the pick-up truck at the time of the collision are the focus of this investigation.

Nature of Injuries / Treatment

Complainant #1 sustained fatal injuries as a result of the collision and was pronounced dead at the scene. Her cause of death was multiple injuries.

Complainant #2 sustained a nasal fracture and a small pneumothorax (collapsed lung) on his left and right sides.

The Scene

The following scene drawings were completed by an SIU forensic investigator and civilian and police witnesses to assist with the investigation:

• Scene Drawing
• Speed-Distance drawings (x4)
• Drawings of Scene by CW #29, CW #38, CW #4 and WO #5
• OPP XYZ text file original (Total Station Coordinate File)
• Rough Sketch Diagram of Scene and Vehicles Evidence (x2)
• V1 Crush drawing, and
• V2 Crush Drawing

The intersection of Daniel Street South and Edey Street is a mixed commercial and residential area and the two roads meet at a T-intersection. Daniel Street South is a two-lane asphalt road that runs in a southwesterly and northeasterly direction and, when heading northeast, has a left turn lane for Edey Street. At the time of the collision, the northbound lane of Daniel Street South was completely closed to vehicular traffic for road construction and there were road closure signs and traffic cones in the area. The posted speed limit on Daniel Street South is 40 km/h.

Edey Street is a two-lane asphalt road that runs off of Daniel Street South in a northwesterly direction and the speed limit is 40 km/h.

The traffic at the intersection was controlled by traffic lights, the area is level and, at the time of the collision, the weather was clear, dry and warm.

Three vehicles were involved in a collision and OPP vehicles were present in the area.

The initial area of impact appeared to be at the southbound stop line on Daniel Street South at Edey Street.

A Ford pick-up truck was oriented in a northeasterly direction in front of 119 Daniel Street South, in the northbound lane, approximately 140 metres beyond the area of impact. The pick-up truck had sustained severe frontal damage and the occupant compartment was destroyed by fire.

A Chevrolet motor vehicle was oriented in a northerly direction in front of 139 Daniel Street, in the southbound lane, about 66 metres beyond the area of impact. The Chevrolet sustained severe frontal damage and a deceased female driver, now known to be Complainant #1, was still inside the vehicle when the SIU arrived.

A green and white GMC Sierra pick-up truck, with Thomas Cavanagh Construction Limited commercial markings on the sides, was oriented in an easterly direction in the northbound lane of Daniel Street South, about 42 metres north of the intersection. The GMC pick-up truck sustained damage to the left rear corner of the vehicle.

Parked near the Chevrolet was an unmarked, dark-grey Ford Taurus police vehicle (driven by SO #2). There were marks on the driver’s side front bumper, the front Ford grill emblem, and front licence plate, which appeared consistent with some sort of contact.

Parked at the intersection of Daniel Street South and Edey Street was an unmarked, grey Dodge Ram 1500 pick-up truck (driven by WO #3).

Parked on Edey Street facing Daniel Street South was a marked, black and white Dodge Charger OPP vehicle (driven by SO #3).

Parked next to 133 Daniel Street South was a marked, black and white Ford Taurus OPP vehicle (driven by SO #1). There were marks on the rear bumper of the vehicle consistent with some sort of contact with the lower portion of the rear bumper hanging slightly unattached.[3]

Scene Diagram

Physical Evidence

Analysis of Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) Data

The analysis of the data begins at Hwy 17 and Lochwinnoch Road, the location where the Ford pick-up truck operated by Complainant #2 was first observed by OPP officers, and concludes at the collision scene on Daniel Street South at Edey Street in the Town of Arnprior.

1. Police vehicle operated by SO #1
2. Police vehicle operated by SO #2
3. Police vehicle operated by SO #3

Eastbound on Highway 17 from Lochwinnoch Road to Goshen Road

The distance between Lochwinnoch Road and Goshen Road is approximately 4.17 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 169 through 184 indicate an average speed of approximately 141.3 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:41:32 to 3:43:13 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 63 through 70 indicate an average speed of approximately 139.5 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:41:34 to 3:43:09 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 115 through 130 indicate an average speed of approximately 139.8 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:41:32 to 3:43:13 p.m

Eastbound on Highway 17 from Goshen Road to McCallum Drive

The distance between Goshen Road and McCallum Drive is approximately 1.78 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 184 through 190 indicate an average speed of approximately 160 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:13 to 3:43:59 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 70 through 74 indicate an average speed of approximately 160.8 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:09 to 3:43:59 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 130 through 136 indicate an average speed of approximately 162.5 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:13 to 3:43:55 p.m

Eastbound on Highway 17 from McCallum Drive to Anderson Road

The distance between McCallum Drive and Anderson Road is approximately 2.32 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 190 through 198 indicate an average speed of approximately 124.4 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:59 to 3:45:02 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 74 through 80 indicate an average speed of approximately 121.2 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:59 to 3:45:04 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 136 through 145 indicate an average speed of approximately 126.9 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:43:55 to 3:45:09 p.m

Eastbound on Highway 17 from Anderson Road to Calabogie Road

The distance between Anderson Road and Calabogie Road is approximately 2.10 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 198 through 206 indicate an average speed of approximately 124.7 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:45:02 to 3:46:06 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 80 through 86 indicate an average speed of approximately 123.1 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:45:04 to 3:46:06 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 145 through 153 indicate an average speed of approximately 125.7 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:45:09 to 3:46:13 p.m

Eastbound Highway 17 from Calabogie Road to Scheel Drive

The distance between Calabogie Road and Scheel Drive is approximately 4.10 km

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 206 through 222 indicate an average speed of approximately 126.7 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:46:06 to 3:48:09 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 86 through 95 indicate an average speed of approximately 125.2 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:46:06 to 3:48:12 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 153 through 168 indicate an average speed of approximately 126.9 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:46:13 to 3:48:08 p.m

Eastbound Highway 17 from Scheel Drive to Campbell Drive

The distance between Scheel Drive and Campbell Drive is approximately 3.98 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 222 through 237 indicate an average speed of approximately 120.9 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:48:09 to 3:50:08 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 95 through 102 indicate an average speed of approximately 127.1 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:48:12 to 3:50:15 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 168 through 183 indicate an average speed of approximately 118.6 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:48:08 to 3:50:07 p.m

Eastbound Highway 17 from Campbell Drive to Daniel Street South

The distance between Campbell Drive and Daniel Street South is approximately 3.12 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 237 through 250 indicate an average speed of approximately 102.9 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:50:08 to 3:51:50 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 102 through 110 indicate an average speed of approximately 101.6 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:50:15 to 3:51:50 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 183 through 195 indicate an average speed of approximately 111.6 km/h between these two landmarks
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:50:07 to 3:51:49 p.m

Northbound Daniel Street South from Highway 17 to Edey Street

The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to the area of the collision is approximately 1.12 km.

Police Vehicle #1:

• Points 250 through 255 indicate an average speed of approximately 79.8 km/h between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South to a point halfway between Arthur Street and Charles Street. The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to Arthur Street is 0.87 km. The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South to Charles Street is 0.98 km
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:51:50 to 3:52:35 p.m

Police Vehicle #2:

• Points 110 through 114 indicate an average speed of approximately 74.6 km/h between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to just south of Arthur Street. The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to Arthur Street is 0.87 km
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:51:50 to 3:52:35 p.m

Police Vehicle #3:

• Points 195 through 202 indicate an average speed of approximately 58.3 km/h between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to a point halfway between Arthur Street and Charles Street. The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to Arthur Street is 0.87 km. The distance between Highway 17, northbound along Daniel Street South, to Charles Street is 0.98 km
• The time stamp between these two landmarks indicated 3:51:49 to 3:52:43 p.m

Minor Collision between OPP Police Vehicle #1 and #2 on Highway 17

Police Vehicle #1 operated by SO #1:

At point 225, which occurred at 3:48:38 p.m., the vehicle speed indicated 77 km/h; at point 224, the speed indicated 114 km/h; and at point 226, the speed indicated 103 km/h.

Police Vehicle #2 operated by SO #2:

At point 97, which occurred at 3:48:49 p.m., the vehicle speed indicated 111 km/h; at point 96, the vehicle speed indicated 116 km/h; and at point 98, the vehicle speed indicated 129 km/h.

Police Vehicle #3 operated by SO #3:

At point 171, which occurred at 3:48:37 p.m., the vehicle speed indicated 14 km/h; at point 170, the vehicle speed indicated 119 km/h; and, at point 172, the vehicle speed indicated 100 km/h.

When plotted on Google earth and maps, the area of the minor contact between the two police vehicles operated by SO #2 and SO #1 occurred in the eastbound passing lane of Highway 17 approximately 0.80 km east of Scheel Drive.

Analysis of AVL Data

The following data is for OPP vehicle #2, operated by SO #2, and OPP vehicle #3, operated by SO #3.

The data from the tablet in OPP vehicle #1 operated by SO #1 was not obtained due to technical issues.

OPP Vehicle #2: Operated by WO #2

Point	Speed	Location and Distance from Scene
122	37.0 km/h	At off ramp Hwy 17 and Daniel Street South.
123	74.0 km/h	Just south of Hwy 17 overpass on Daniel Street South.
124	94.9 km/h	Just south of Hwy 17 overpass on Daniel Street South.
125	94.9 km/h	Bottom of overpass ramp north of Hwy 17.
126	93.4 km/h	630.5 metres south of the collision scene.
127	74.0 km/h	376.9 metres south of the collision scene.
128	70.8 km/h	139.5 metres south of the collision scene.
129	27.3 km/h	At the collision scene.
130	27.3 km/h	14.4 metres north of the collision scene.
131	0.0 km/h	14.4 metres north of the collision scene.

OPP Vehicle #3: Operated by SO #3

Point	Speed	Location and Distance from Scene
629	22.5 km/h	At off ramp from Hwy 17 at Daniel Street South.
630	28.9 km/h	On Daniel Street South, just south of Hwy 17 overpass.
631	51.5 km/h	On Daniel Street South, just south of Hwy 17 overpass.
632	91.7 km/h	On Daniel Street South, just south of Hwy 17 overpass.
633	94.9 km/h	At Hwy 17 overpass on Daniel Street South – N/B.
634	101.4 km/h	51.7 metres north of overpass on Daniel Street South.
635	103.0 km/h	109 metres north of overpass on Daniel Street South.
636	93.4 km/h	165 metres north of overpass on Daniel Street South.
637	98.2 km/h	220 metres north of overpass on Daniel Street South
638	107.8 km/h	280 metres north of overpass on Daniel Street South.
639	88.5 km/h	360 metres north of overpass opposite Tim Hortons.
640	94.9 km/h	At Winners Circle on Daniel Street South.
641	94.9 km/h	660.8 metres south of the collision scene.
642	90.2 km/h	608.3 metres south of the collision scene.
643	93.3 km/h	558.4 metres south of the collision scene.
644	104.6 km/h	449.3 metres south of the collision scene.
645	62.7 km/h	458.0 metres south of the collision scene at CTC.
646	70.8 km/h	401.3 metres south of the collision scene.
647	82.1 km/h	355.7 metres south of the collision scene.
648	82.1 km/h	310.2 metres south of the collision scene.
649	74.0 km/h	266.7 m. south of the collision scene – at Arthur Street.
650	67.6 km/h	227.0 metres south of the collision scene.
651	67.6 km/h	188.0 metres south of the collision scene.
652	67.6 km/h	151.3 m south of the collision scene – at Charles Street.
653	64.4 km/h	114.3 metres south of the collision scene.
654	57.9 km/h	79.9 metres south of the collision scene.
655	51.5 km/h	48.3 metres south of the collision scene.
656	33.8 km/h	12.9 metres south of the collision scene.
657	16.1 km/h	At the collision scene.
658	4.8 km/h	7.5 metres north of the collision scene.

Expert Evidence

Observations of SIU Collision Reconstructionist

On September 25, 2017, at about 3:50 p.m., Complainant #2 operated a Ford pick-up truck northbound on Daniel Street South in the Town of Arnprior. Time distance calculations indicated that the pick-up truck was travelling at an average speed between 102.7 km/h and 112.5 km/h, northbound on Daniel Street South from the Tim Hortons to slightly north of the Canadian Tire store.[4]

The weather was very hot and the roads were dry.

Complainant #1 operated a Chevrolet motor vehicle southbound on Daniel Street South and was stopped at the traffic signal at the intersection of Edey Street.

The front of the Ford pick-up truck struck the front of the Chevrolet calculated at a minimum speed of 75.2 km/h.[5] The area of impact occurred at the stop line for southbound traffic on Daniel Street South at the intersection of Edey Street. The Chevrolet was pushed backwards as a result of the collision and travelled northbound on Daniel Street South in the southbound lane and came to rest facing west about 64 metres north of the stop line.

The Ford pick-up truck continued travelling northbound in the southbound lane on Daniel Street South, crossed into the northbound lane, and struck a parked, unoccupied GMC pick-up truck, in the left rear corner. The GMC pick-up truck slid forward as a result of the contact and rotated in a clockwise direction and came to rest in the northbound lane on Daniel Street South in an easterly direction.

The Ford pick-up truck continued travelling northbound in the northbound lane of Daniel Street South and came to rest in the middle of the roadway, just south of Robert Street. The Ford pick-up truck sustained major fire damage to the occupant compartment of the vehicle.

Time/Distance Analysis

The SIU reconstructionist used the CCTV videos from the Tim Hortons, Home Hardware, and CTC (Canadian Tire), and the diagrams created by forensic investigators using the Total Station to conduct a time/distance analysis to obtain the average speeds between two landmarks of the involved vehicles travelling northeast on Daniel Street South. The information is summarized in the columns below:

CCTV	Ford Pick-up truck	Police Vehicle #1 (marked black/white)	Police Vehicle #2 (unmarked/grey)	Police Vehicle #3 (marked black and white)
Tim Hortons (about 800 metres from the collision scene)	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 102 km/h.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 102 km/h, 0.25 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 102 km/h, 4.5 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 102 km/h, 5.9 seconds behind the pick-up truck.
Home Hardware (about 490 metres from the collision scene)	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 112 km/h.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 101 km/h, 0.47 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 87 km/h, 5 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 87 km/h, 6.1 seconds behind the pick-up truck.
Canadian Tire Corporation (About 420 metres from the collision scene)	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 109 km/h.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 99 km/h, 0.5 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northeast on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 71 km/h, 6.2 seconds behind the pick-up truck.	Travelling northbound on Daniel Street South at an average speed of 68 km/h, 7.3 seconds behind the pick-up truck.

Video/Audio/Photographic Evidence

Route Video

Based on information received from the communication recordings from the OPP, the following details the route travelled by Complainant #2 and the OPP:

• The route commenced (start 0.0 km) at the eastbound (E/B) Hwy 17 intersection at County Road 6 / Lochwinnoch Road in Renfrew County. The posted speed limit in this area was 90 km/h, with one lane in each direction, and the area was not populated, with a few farm fields and wooded areas;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 and crossed the intersection at Goshen Road (No traffic controls for Hwy 17 traffic) (4.2 km);
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 and crossed the intersection at McCallum Drive (No traffic controls for Hwy 17 traffic) (5.9 km);
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 and crossed the intersection at County Road 63 / Anderson Road / Miller Road (No traffic controls for Hwy 17 traffic) (8.2 km). At this intersection there were a few residences on the south side with backyards toward Hwy 17 and a few residences a distance off the roadway on the north side of the highway;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 and crossed the intersection at County Road 54 / McLean Drive / Calabogie Road (No traffic controls for Hwy 17 traffic) (10.3 km). At this intersection there were a few farm buildings off the roadway on the north side and a few light industrial buildings on the south side, as well as several residential buildings off the roadway on the south side;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 with a posted speed limit of 100 km/h (13.6 km). The area was mostly farmland and forest;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 17 crossing over the Scheel Drive underpass (14.4 km). In that area the highway changed from Hwy 17 to Hwy 417, and there were two eastbound lanes for Hwy 417;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 417 passing the exit at Campbell Drive / Exit 187 (17.7 km);
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 417 crossing under Pine Grove Road overpass (18.4 km);
• Approaching Arnprior, before exit 184, there was a sign indicating that the Business Area was at White Lake Road. Just before the exit at White Lake Road there were numerous residential buildings on the north side of the highway;
• The route continued E/B on Hwy 417 and then exited at exit 184 / County Road 2 / Daniel Street South/ White Lake Road (20.9 km). Upon exiting the highway, there were numerous light industrial and commercial buildings on the south side and east side of the intersection of White Lake Road and the E/B off ramp. There was a warning speed limit sign of 60 km/h on the off ramp, as well as a traffic signal warning sign. The three-way intersection was controlled by traffic signals;
• The route turned left onto White lake Road/Daniel Street South then continued northbound (N/B) on County Road 2 (CR 2)/ Daniel Street South. The roadway at this location was two lanes northbound (N/B) and two lanes southbound and the posted speed limit was 60 km/h;
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South crossing over Hwy 17 (21.6 km). There was a traffic signal warning sign on the overpass;
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South, crossing at the three-way intersection of the westbound (W/B) Hwy 17 off ramp (21.9 km). The intersection was controlled by traffic signals in all directions and the posted speed limit changed to 50 km/h. There were numerous commercial buildings in this area on both sides of the road. Slightly beyond this intersection there was a large white sign with black lettering indicating, “Daniel Street Closed at Michael Street, Follow D-1, EDR Route Follow D-1;”
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South, crossing the four-way intersection at Winners Circle (22.0 km). The intersection was controlled by traffic signals in all directions. There was a small detour sign posted with “D-1” and an ahead left arrow;
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South, crossing the four-way intersection at Baskin Drive, where the posted speed limit changed to 40 km/h (22.1 km). The intersection was controlled by traffic signals in all directions. There was a small detour sign posted just before the intersection with “D-1” and a left arrow. The roadway changed from two lanes N/B to one lane N/B just north of Baskin Drive. There was a warning sign indicating the right lane ended there. There were many commercial buildings and several residential buildings in this area, including a Canadian Tire store on the left and Rexall and Home Hardware stores on the right (22.3 km);
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South, crossing the three-way intersection at Arthur Street (22.6 km). The intersection was controlled by traffic signals (traffic controls were for Daniel Street South traffic only). There was a single orange and black construction pylon and a small orange construction sign with a symbol of a person walking and a left arrow on the south side of this intersection. There was a mix of residential and commercial buildings in this area, on both sides of the road. At the intersection of Charles Street there was a posted speed limit sign of 40 km/h and next to it was a large diamond shaped orange “construction” sign with a straight arrow and a black and orange pylon at the base on the north side. There were no traffic controls for Daniel Street South traffic. There was a large diamond shaped orange “detour” sign with a straight arrow and a black and orange pylon at the base just past the previous sign;
• The route continued N/B on CR 2/Daniel Street South and terminated at Edey Street (end 22.7 km). This intersection was controlled by traffic lights in all directions. On the south side of the intersection there was a large white sign with black lettering indicating, “Daniel Street Closed at Michael Street, Follow D-4,” with two black and orange pylons at the base. At the intersection there was a small orange detour sign with a left arrow and a single orange and black pylon on the southeast corner. Also at the intersection there was a left turn lane. On the north side of the intersection, the N/B lane was completely blocked and there was a large square, orange and black checkered construction sign with a left arrow reading, “Road Closed” and “Chemin Fermee” on the bottom of it. There were two orange and black pylons at the base of the sign and four orange and black pylons in a painted space between the southbound and northbound lanes, in front of an inoperative lighted sign that was turned sideways and not readable to traffic displaying, “Road Closed”.

Summary of CCTV

A total of seven CCTV videos were obtained by SIU investigators from various sources relevant to the incident.

Squeaky Kleen Auto Spa – 470 O’Brien Road, Renfrew (Hwy 60)[6]

The camera system time was two minutes ahead of real time. No pursuit was captured on the video recording.

• At 3:35:01 p.m., a pick-up truck [believed to be operated by Complainant #2] travelled northeast on O’Brien Street in the centre turning lane, at a high rate of speed, and passed several vehicles, including a transport truck, travelling northeast on O’Brien Street in the single curb lane
• At 3:35:45 p.m., a marked OPP vehicle travelled southwest on O’Brien Street in the single curb lane and turned northwest into the OPP Detachment located at 450 O’Brien Road, and
• At 3:41:19 p.m., a grey vehicle [possibly an unmarked OPP vehicle] travelled northeast on O’Brien Street, at a high rate of speed. The image was grainy and it was difficult to ascertain whether or not the vehicle’s emergency lighting was activated

Home Hardware- 555 O’Brien Road, Renfrew (Hwy 60)[7]

No pursuit was captured on the video recordings. Video was consistent with CCTV videos from the Squeaky Clean Auto Spa.

Tim Hortons - 2 Staye Court, Arnprior[8]

The camera was directed eastbound towards Daniel Street South. The Tim Hortons’ parking lot and “Drive Thru” were in the foreground and Daniel Street South was in the background with “No Frills” evident on the east side of Daniel Street South. There were no timestamps on the video but the video was marked Monday, September 25, 2017, 3:50 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. The timelines referenced were from the Windows Media Player.

[13]

 

• At 03:03 minutes into the video, a grey pick-up truck travelled northbound on Daniel Street South in the passing lane. Directly behind the pick-up truck was a marked OPP vehicle[9] travelling northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane
• At 03:06 (three seconds later), an unmarked grey OPP vehicle[10] with emergency lighting activated travelled northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane
• At 03:08, a marked OPP vehicle[11] with emergency roof lights activated travelled northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane
• At 03:31, a marked OPP vehicle[12] with emergency roof lights activated travelled northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane
• At 04:10, a marked OPP SUV
• with no emergency roof lights activated travelled northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane, and
• At 04:25, a black pick-up truck[14] travelled northbound on Daniel Street South, in the passing lane

 

Mr. Gas Bar – 400 Daniel Street South, Arnprior [15]

 

Consistent with the CCTV video from the Tim Hortons.

 

Shell Gas Station- 395 Daniel Street South[16]

 

Consistent with the CCTV video from the Tim Hortons.

 

Canadian Tire Corporation (CTC) - 375 Daniel Street South, Arnprior[17]

 

The CTC provided video evidence from four cameras that were directed eastbound toward Daniel Street South. Camera 1 – “Outside Garage West End” provided the most detailed evidence. The camera was directed eastbound to Daniel Street South from the centre of the CTC building, encompassing Home Hardware on the east side of the street, or right side of the screen, to Pet Valu on the east side of the street, or left side of the screen. There was no audio.

 

• On September 25, 2017, at 3:40:47 p.m., a marked OPP vehicle[18] with its emergency red and blue lighting activated travelled southwest on Daniel Street South at higher than normal speed
• At 3:52:21 p.m., a pick-up truck travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at higher than normal speed
• At 3:52:21 p.m., a marked OPP vehicle[19] travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a higher than normal speed, behind the pick-up truck. The police vehicle’s emergency red and blue lighting was active
• At 3:52:23 p.m., a silver SUV travelled behind the first OPP vehicle
• At 3:52:26 p.m., an unmarked grey OPP vehicle[20] travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a higher than normal speed, behind the silver SUV. The emergency red and blue lighting was activated
• At 3:52:27 p.m., a marked OPP vehicle[21] travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a higher than normal speed, behind the second OPP vehicle. The police vehicle’s emergency red and blue lighting was active
• At 3:52:30 p.m., the unmarked police vehicle (second OPP vehicle) passed to the left of the silver SUV
• At 3:52:32 p.m., the marked police vehicle (third OPP vehicle) passed to the left of the silver SUV
• At 3:52:54 p.m., a marked OPP vehicle[22] travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a higher than normal speed. The police vehicle’s emergency lighting was active
• At 3:53:00 p.m., the marked OPP vehicle (fourth OPP vehicle) passed on the left of the white SUV
• At 3:53:45 p.m., a black pick-up truck[23] with no emergency lighting active, travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a higher than normal speed
• At 3:55:39 p.m., a large marked OPP SUV[24] with no emergency lighting activated, travelled northeast on Daniel Street South at a normal speed

 

Home Hardware – 290 Daniel Street South[25]

 

Consistent with the CCTV video from the CTC.

 

Photographs, Videos and Statements Provided by Civilians Relevant to the Incident:

 

The following scene photographs, videos and statements were reviewed:

 

• CW #21 provided one photograph that depicted smoke billowing from a distance
• CW #17 provided one photograph that appeared to be taken shortly after the collision. It depicted Daniel Street South, northeast of Edey Street, with three marked OPP vehicles and a black SUV behind, and around, a fire truck. Ahead of the fire truck was a pick-up truck that was on fire with smoke billowing from it. There were two uniformed police officers, one was a male and one was a female, and a male firefighter present. CW #17 also provided five videos which he recorded with his cellular phone. The video recordings were post-collision and the quality of the recordings were poor and shaky and depicted the damaged Ford pick-up truck with smoke billowing from the front of the vehicle, the damaged Chevrolet, and emergency vehicles and police officers on scene
• CW #23 and CW #31 provided 23 photographs of the scene taken after the collision which were consistent with the information that they provided to the SIU
• CW #29 provided 22 photographs of the scene taken after the collision consistent with the information provided to the SIU
• CW #33 provided a photograph of the collision damage to the Cavanagh Construction truck
• The Home Hardware located at 555 O’Brien Road in Renfrew provided a video recording
• The Squeaky Kleen Auto Spa located at 470 O’Brien Road in Renfrew provided a video recording and notes to the SIU, and
• CW #19 made notes and provided them to the SIU

 

Facebook Messenger

 

On September 29, 2017, CW #30 provided SIU investigators with screenshots of the electronic messages sent between an unnamed party and Complainant #2, and between CW #49 and Complainant #2, in relation to this incident.

 

Messages between Unnamed Party and Complainant #2

 

On September 25, 2017, Complainant #2 messaged CW #27’s friend, the unnamed party. The unnamed party forwarded screenshots of Complainant #2’s messages to CW #27. CW #27 provided the messages to CW #30, those messages follow:

 

• 1:22 p.m., the Complainant: “Do you know CW #27? I know that you hate me but it would be helpful if you could help me out.”
• 1:55 p.m., the unnamed party: “Yes I do, why?”
• Complainant #2: “Her mom, CW #30, threatened me. I’m just trying to figure out where they live.”
• The Unnamed Party: “You already told me that but I think they moved so I can’t help you.”
• Complainant #2: “How many kids do they have? Isn’t it 3 or 4?”

 

Messages between CW #49 and Complainant #2

 

On September 25, 2017, the Complainant messaged CW #49. CW #49 forwarded screenshots of Complainant #2’s messages to CW #30 on September 29, 2017. CW #30 had never met CW #49. Those messages follow:

 

• 1:17 p.m., Complainant #2: “Do you know CW #27?”
• 1:35 p.m., Complainant #2: “Or CW #30, that’s her mom. It’s going down ‘cause that fat fucking pig threatened me and I’m the wrong person to fucking threatened because I’ll murder that whole fucking family.”
• CW #49: “No ideas.I feel like I’ve heard her name but never met her.” Complainant #2 sent two pictures of CW #30 to CW #49.”
• Complainant #2: “They threatened the wrong person because I’m going through one of moods and I really wanna do something fucking stupid. They have 3 or 4 kids and I’ll kill ‘em too.”
• CW #49: “What did she say?”
• Complainant #2: “She said something like “if you ever think of messaging my daughter again you’ll be sorry.So I messaged her. I don’t fucking care. I kill every one of her kids and make her watch. I’m not afraid of anybody, I’ll just throw a cheeseburger to the cow and she’ll get distracted.”
• CW #49: “Maybe she doesn’t want her daughter talking to someone who was in jail? I’m sorry it’s the truth.”
• Complainant #2: “Yeah but she threatened me now it’s personal.”
• Complainant #2: “It was while I was in jail and I was gunna let it go but I’m feeling’ homicidal so I wanna have some fun with faggots around here. I don’t really care who gets killed but I thought I’d target one family. I’m fucking tired of having no money. Once I get my phone I’m out of money again. I can’t do this anymore. I don’t want to be alive but I’m taking people with me. I’m not getting ahead and I’ve had enough. People constantly lying to me finally pushed me over the edge.”
• CW #49: “You haven’t been out very long. Give it some time.”
• Complainant #2: “That’s a bullshit thing that people say. It hasn’t gotten better in 20 fucking years. I try to help people constantly & they can’t find time out of their busy days to fucking hang out. And then when something happens they come out like “we would’ve help if we would’ve helpped” well you woulda if you wouldn’t have been a cunt. Thinking about killing people and myself everyday is fucking get to me and I have to act on it before it drives me fucking nuts. Sitting around the house 24/7 noy going anywhere I can’t do it.”
• CW #49: “Well it’s true you haven’t given anything a chance. Not everything comes on a silver platter & not everything comes at once.”
• Complainant #2: “I have been giving people changes and they keep lying to me.”
• CW #49: “Then pick better people to talk to.”
• Complainant #2: “I’ve been trying.Everybody has a fucking excuse. I’m tired of it.”

 

Communications Recordings

 

Summary of OPP Communication Recordings and Event Chronology

 

• On September 25, 2017, at 2:59 p.m., CW #42 called the OPP to report that a man in a … (Ford pick-up truck) was travelling toward Grist Mill Road in Eganville and was nearly involved in a head-on collision with a dump truck and an SUV. The driver of the Ford forced the SUV onto the sidewalk and gave everyone ‘the finger;&rsquo
• At 3:15 p.m., WO #1 called an OPP call taker in Smith Falls to advise that she was with an Eganville resident, CW #20, who had had his Ford pick-up truck stolen from the parking lot of the Eganville Community Arena between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. There was half a tank of gas in the truck and the keys were inside the console;
• At 3:21 p.m., an undesignated police officer called the OPP dispatcher in Smiths Falls to advise that she just spoke with a caller who had a Ford pick-up truck stolen from Eganville in the last two hours, and she did not know if the call was related
• At 3:22 p.m., SO #2 said she would head that way. WO #6 said he would head that way;
• At 3:23 p.m., the dispatcher assigned the theft investigation of the motor vehicle to WO #9 and advised to be on the lookout for the stolen vehicle. SO #3 and SO #2 were looking for the pick-up truck eastbound on Hwy 60. SO #1 said he would make his way toward Hwy 60
• At 3:24 p.m., WO #3 asked for vehicle descriptors. The dispatcher said it was a pick-up truck, possibly related to a theft of motor vehicle from the parking lot of the Eganville Community Arena. That vehicle was a Ford F-150 with a half tank of gas. The keys were in the console. The dispatcher would check the vehicle licence plate information. WO #8 told SO #3 to keep in mind that Complainant #2 lived nearby where the truck was stolen;
• At 3:25 p.m., WO #9 said he saw Complainant #2 walking in Eganville an hour ago
• At 3:25 p.m., a male police officer [believed to be WO #8] said they would keep that in mind, the timing was right. The dispatcher addressed all units looking for the grey pick-up truck and provided a detailed description with licence plate number;
• At 3:27 p.m., WO #5 engaged himself on the call. The dispatcher said the truck was stolen from the parking lot of the Eganville Community Arena, near Complainant #2’s location. The Killaloe Units were going to Complainant #2’s residence to check on him and make sure it was not him, in case he was making his way to Arnprior for any reason
• At 3:33 p.m., CW #36 called the OPP to advise that he was near Veteran’s Memorial Boulevard, just past the police station in Renfrew, and there was a man driving a Ford half-ton truck the wrong way on the boulevard and pushing people off the road. The driver of the truck was travelling 70 to 80 miles per hour[26] toward Hwy 17;
• At 3:33 p.m., another caller contacted the OPP to report a driver (description provided) in a half-ton passed her on the wrong side of the road and the driver was travelling about 100 miles an hour[27] in town and almost hit two high school kids
• At 3:34 p.m., CW #10 called the OPP to report a young man driving recklessly on Plaunt Street[28] in a pick-up truck (description provided). The driver of the pick-up truck came out of the Rexall parking lot and CW #10 had to swerve across the driveway because the male driver was going to hit her. The male driver did not stop at Hall Street and went roaring across through a stop sign without looking. The male driver gave CW #10 ‘the finger’ because she was in his way. He took the off ramp at O’Brien Road, travelled the wrong way, almost got hit by a dump truck, and went flying northeast toward Hwy 17;
• At 3:35 p.m., CW #36 called the OPP again to report that he travelled to Hwy 17 but did not see the male driver. The male driver was travelling at a high rate of speed and he drove the wrong way on Memorial Boulevard and was whipping back and forth
• At 3:37 p.m., the dispatcher spoke with SO #3 to report another call regarding a Ford pick-up last seen heading northbound on Veteran’s Memorial Boulevard toward Hwy 17
• At 3:39 p.m., WO #3 said she was at Lochwinnoch Road and a truck (description provided) was travelling eastbound on Hwy 17, and had just passed her
• At 3:40 p.m., SO #3 reported, “If it’s him he’s threatened suicide by police before.” Emergency sirens were heard in the background of the transmission. WO #3 said she would try and catch up to it. WO #3 said she was in an unmarked pick-up truck, with no siren, and there were three large dump trucks travelling behind the pick-up truck;
• At 3:44 p.m., WO #3 said she just passed Miller Road and confirmed the truck’s licence plate as that previously provided by the dispatcher. WO #3 said she had no means to stop the vehicle. The dispatcher asked WO #3 to try a controlled rolling block and requested an NCO.[29] SO #2 said the police officers would attempt the rolling block. A siren was heard in the background of the transmission. SO #2 asked if WO #5 was ahead with his spike belt in case the rolling block was unsuccessful
• At 3:45 p.m., WO #3 said she was approaching Calabogie and McLean Drive. SO #3 said, “We’re not too far behind, just past Miller.” WO #3 said, “We’re doing just 100 km/h. (unintelligible) traffic we’re not going fast.” WO #3 said she was just past Calabogie and “we’re” stuck behind a school bus. Two cars behind the school bus, then the pick-up truck, and “we’re” doing 80 km/h
• At 3:46 p.m., WO #4 asked if the communications centre sergeant was monitoring the event and the dispatcher said the communications sergeant said she was. WO #4 confirmed that no uniform vehicles were involved at the moment, and the dispatcher said correct. SO #2 said, “We can see that school bus. Once we get a little bit closer we’re going to shut our lights and sirens off everybody. It’s going to come up to a passing lane and we’re just going to try and stagger ourselves so we can get one in front, one behind, and one beside, and we will try and stop the vehicle that way.” Sirens were heard in the background. WO #1 confirmed;
• At 3:47 p.m., SO #3 said her lights were off. SO #2 said she could see the vehicle and “we’re” about six cars behind it. “(SO #1), you’re going to go in front. I’ll try and stay beside, (SO #3), you can come up from behind me, WO #5 (Hwy) 17 and White Lake if you want to get a spike belt ready.” WO #7 said he and the sergeant were just east of Calabogie Road on Hwy 17. WO #3 said she was getting in the passing lane. SO #2 said, “If you feel like you’re going to get hit by this vehicle, just get out of the way and we’ll just try and follow closely behind and let WO #5 get him with a spike belt.” WO #3 said she was travelling 110 km/h on Hwy 17
• At 3:48 p.m., SO #2 said, “Okay, just back off (WO #3), were going to try and position ourselves around it. (SO #1) you call it from here because you’re right behind him okay?” SO #1 said he (the driver of the pick-up truck) just locked up his brakes. SO #2 told SO #1 to get out of the way, and to back off from it a little and told WO #5 to get ready with his spike belt;
• A male police officer said, “When you get up to that truck, hold the traffic back”
• At 3:49 p.m., SO #1 said, “He’s not going to let me by. He’s a young male wearing glasses.” SO #2 told SO #1 to back off from him a little bit and to follow him from a distance behind. SO #2 reported contact between her vehicle and SO #1’s vehicle but they were fine and driving. The dispatcher acknowledged. SO #1 said to give “him” a bit of space
• At 3:49 p.m., WO #7 told WO #4 that he would get in front of the truck and WO #4 can blow past WO #7. WO #4 acknowledged. SO #2 said, “10-3 we have passed WO #5. We’re just going by Campbell. He’s in lane two and he’s a little bit all over the roadway here, we’re going about 125 (km/h). I’ll let you know when we’re getting the right lane. We got one car in both lanes so you’ll be able to see. We will flick on our lights whenever we get to see you. 10-4?;”
• At 3:50 p.m., WO #5 acknowledged and said he was at the other overpass at White Lake Road. WO #7 said he was at Campbell ‘splitting the lanes’ and slowing traffic down. SO #1 said there was one white minivan in front of the driver and “we’re” travelling at about 120 km/h. WO #2 said to WO #5 that they were travelling underneath the Pinegrove Overpass and asked WO #5 if he was underneath at the White Lake overpass. WO #5 confirmed;
• At 3:51 p.m., the communications sergeant asked whether all units had their lights and sirens on or off. SO #1 responded all off. WO #2 said the vehicle was exiting at White Lake Road. SO #2 asked SO #1 to pull in front of the vehicle at the stop light, but not to get too close at the stop light. SO #1 acknowledged. SO #2 said the driver of the pick-up truck just ‘blew through the red light’, and she asked the communications sergeant regarding direction for the pursuit. SO #2 said the driver of the pick-up truck was travelling in the wrong direction on the overpass. The communications sergeant said ‘it’ was a wrong way vehicle and “we’re going to do everything we can to stop it. I am permitting you to use intentional contact, since it’s a dangerous driver 10-4;”
• At 3:52:12 p.m., SO #2 said, “We’re coming into a heavily populated area. (SO #1) if you get an opportunity, take it. Be mindful of pedestrians.” The communications sergeant asked the police officers to let her know if there were pedestrians or school buses in the area;
• At 3:52:25 p.m., SO #1 said there were pedestrians and “he’s” going into a construction zone
• At 3:52:30 p.m., the communications sergeant said, “We’re going to have to terminate then. Terminate, all units pull over will advise, ah…” SO #1 said, “He’s just gone head on into another vehicle.” SO #2 said, “It’s a collision, a collision;’&rsquo
• At 3:52:44 p.m., the communications sergeant said EMS was en route. WO #4 asked the police officers for their location. SO #2 said Daniel Street and there was a bad collision. She asked SO #1 to move his vehicle so she could get around. He [the driver of the pick-up truck] was exiting his vehicle, and she asked SO #1 to follow the driver and she would remain with the patient;
• At 3:53 p.m., SO #2 was with an unresponsive female in a vehicle
• At 3:54 p.m., SO #2 said, “10-92 in custody;”
• At 4:52 p.m., WO #9 said he had just interviewed the truck owner and there were firearms under the back seat, “a .22 and a shotgun.”

 

Forensic Evidence

 

There were no submissions made to the Centre of Forensic Sciences.

 

Materials obtained from Police Service

 

Upon request, the SIU obtained and reviewed the following materials and documents from the Arnprior, Killaloe, and Renfrew OPP Detachments:

 

• News Release Update 2-Dec, 28, 2017
• Event Chronologies (x7)
• Facebook Video – Created by Complainant #2, 2016
• General Occurrence Reports (x4)
• GPS Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) Data Table-Sept 25, 2017
• GPS Gate and CAD of seven involved police vehicles
• GPS Gate Data Table of seven involved police vehicles
• Incident Statement of CW #40
• Notes of WO #s 1-10
• OPP News Release-Update 2
• OPP Witness Synopsis of CW #32-Oct 2, 2017
• OPP Police Transmissions Communications Recordings
• 911 Call Recordings
• Procedure: Alternative Stopping
• Procedure: Drive Wrong Way Occurrences
• Procedure: Suspect Apprehension Pursuits (SAPs)
• Procedure: SAPs
• Provincial Communications Centre Roles and Responsibilities
• OPP Collision Reconstruction Report with Appendices
• SAP Records, and
• Subject Profile for Complainant #2

 

Additionally, the SIU obtained the following materials and documents from other sources:

 

• Scene photographs taken by witnesses at the collision scene
• Medical records of Complainant #2
• The post-mortem examination and related toxicology report of Complainant #1
• Facebook messages between Complainant #2 and several other parties
• CCTV footage from seven different commercial premises, and
• Correspondence from County of Renfrew as follows:
  • The Manager of Infrastructure for the County of Renfrew confirmed that a water main replacement project was completed along Daniel Street South, between Charles Street and Michael Street, in Arnprior, during the summer of 2017, and
  • A Road Occupancy Permit was issued to Cavanagh Construction Ltd on September 21, 2017, to complete a water main replacement on Daniel Street South between Michael Street and Harvey Street. The project was scheduled to begin on the morning of September 25, 2017. As Daniel Street was closed at Michael Street, the first available through road for detour was Edey Street

 

 

Sections 1-3, Ontario Regulation 266/10, Ontario Police Services Act – Suspect Apprehension Pursuits

 

1. (1) For the purposes of this Regulation, a suspect apprehension pursuit occurs when a police officer attempts to direct the driver of a motor vehicle to stop, the driver refuses to obey the officer and the officer pursues in a motor vehicle for the purpose of stopping the fleeing motor vehicle or identifying the fleeing motor vehicle or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle

(2) A suspect apprehension pursuit is discontinued when police officers are no longer pursuing a fleeing motor vehicle for the purpose of stopping the fleeing motor vehicle or identifying the fleeing motor vehicle or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle.

2. (1) A police officer may pursue, or continue to pursue, a fleeing motor vehicle that fails to stop

1. if the police officer has reason to believe that a criminal offence has been committed or is about to be committed; or
2. for the purposes of motor vehicle identification or the identification of an individual in the vehicle

 

(2) Before initiating a suspect apprehension pursuit, a police officer shall determine that there are no alternatives available as set out in the written procedures of,

1. the police force of the officer established under subsection 6 (1), if the officer is a member of an Ontario police force as defined in the Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009
2. a police force whose local commander was notified of the appointment of the officer under subsection 6 (1) of the Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009, if the officer was appointed under Part II of that Act; or
3. the local police force of the local commander who appointed the officer under subsection 15 (1) of the Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009, if the officer was appointed under Part III of that Act

(3) A police officer shall, before initiating a suspect apprehension pursuit, determine whether in order to protect public safety the immediate need to apprehend an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle or the need to identify the fleeing motor vehicle or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle outweighs the risk to public safety that may result from the pursuit.

(4) During a suspect apprehension pursuit, a police officer shall continually reassess the determination made under subsection (3) and shall discontinue the pursuit when the risk to public safety that may result from the pursuit outweighs the risk to public safety that may result if an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle is not immediately apprehended or if the fleeing motor vehicle or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle is not identified.

(5) No police officer shall initiate a suspect apprehension pursuit for a non-criminal offence if the identity of an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle is known.

(6) A police officer engaging in a suspect apprehension pursuit for a non-criminal offence shall discontinue the pursuit once the fleeing motor vehicle or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle is identified.

1. (1) A police officer shall notify a dispatcher when the officer initiates a suspect apprehension pursuit

(2) The dispatcher shall notify a communications supervisor or road supervisor, if a supervisor is available, that a suspect apprehension pursuit has been initiated

According to OPP Orders: Alternative Stopping:

Stopping Tactics: In instances where a violator stop is considered non-routine, e.g. stolen vehicle, driver/passengers are wanted, high probability of the driver fleeing from the police, the uniform member shall, whenever possible, prior to signaling the driver to stop:

• Alert the applicable Police Communications Centre (PCC) of the situation including the vehicle description, location, speed and direction
• Advise the PCC whether the police vehicle is:
  • A marked pursuit rated vehicle; or
  • An unmarked vehicle
• Request assistance of other units in the vicinity, and
• Consider the use of other stopping techniques including:
  • Tandem stops
  • Tire deflation devices-spike belt
  • Discontinuation – and apprehend at another time
  • Strategic following
  • Rolling blocks
  • Pinning; or
  • Intentional contact; or
  • Consider the use of Satellite Technology Apprehension Response (STAR)

When determining which stopping technique to employ, the uniform member shall consider public and uniform member safety and the immediate need to apprehend as set out in Suspect Apprehension Pursuits policy.

Tire Deflation Device-Spike Belt: A spike belt has been proven to be a safe and reliable method of preventing or quickly terminating a suspect apprehension pursuit. In order to realize their maximum benefits, spike belts should be assigned to cruisers that are on patrol, especially during the night shift. A uniform member may utilize the spike belt when attempting to prevent or terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit, subject to the following considerations:

• Only when the suspect motor vehicle is equipped with a minimum of four wheels, and
• On roadways where traffic, other than the suspect motor vehicle, is not reasonably expected to cross the spike belt

According to OPP Orders: Drive Wrong Way Occurences:

Deemed Life Threatening Occurrences Responsibilities: A report of a motor vehicle being driven in the wrong direction on a divided highway endangering other drivers on the roadway shall be considered a life threatening occurrence.

Employee: An employee becoming aware of or receiving such a report shall forthwith notify the PCC, providing as many details as possible, including where known:

• The highway involved and approximate time/location when observed
• Direction of travel
• Approximate speed
• Description of the vehicle, driver/occupants, and
• Any other information known about/relevant to the incident, e.g. hazardous road/traffic conditions in the area, apparent driver action/condition, etc

Communications Supervisor: When such a report is received at the PCC, it shall be immediately communicated to the communications supervisor who shall take charge of the occurrence and determine/direct the necessary action required in the interest of public safety and stopping the motor vehicle from continuing in the wrong direction. In determining the necessary course of action, consideration should be given to the use of roadblocks/traffic diversion and spike belts.

PCC Broadcast: Immediately upon receipt, the communications supervisor shall ensure all pertinent details of the occurrences are broadcast to:

• All uniform members within the detachment jurisdiction, and
• Neighbouring detachment members/jurisdictions that may potentially become involved due to the location and direction of travel of the motor vehicle, including any uniform members travelling through the area that:
  • May be able to assist
  • May be in danger of the incident; or
  • Are in a position to provide relevant information through observation

According to OPP Orders: Suspect Apprehension Pursuits:

Definition of Marked Pursuit Rated Vehicle: For the purpose of this policy, a marked pursuit rated vehicle is defined as a police vehicle:

• Affixed with clearly visible decals identifying the OPP crest and/or the word Police: and
• Equipped with pursuit rated tires, a security screen, 360-degree emergency lighting, police radio and a siren

Critical Policy: For the purpose of stopping a fleeing motor vehicle, uniform members may engage in a suspect apprehension pursuit when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the driver or passengers of the suspect vehicle has grounds to believe that the driver or passenger of the suspect vehicle has committed, or is about to commit, an indictable Criminal Code offence involving serious threats or acts of violence, or even without police presence, the actions of the driver pose immediate and grave risks to public safety (e.g. person attempting suicide through head-on collision).

Members shall NOT engage in a pursuit when they suspect offence is solely:

• A provincial offence infraction; or
• Property crime, including the possession of a stolen vehicle

The offence for which the pursuit is commenced must have occurred prior to the pursuit being initiated.

A suspect apprehension pursuit is terminated when police officers are no longer pursuing a fleeing motor vehicle for the purpose of stopping the motor vehicle.

Public Safety Factors:Public safety shall be the paramount consideration in any decision to initiate/continue/terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit and represents a balance that may change rapidly and must be continuously assessed. A suspect apprehension pursuit shall be the choice of last resort and will be considered only when other alternatives are unavailable.

In assessing whether to initiate/continue/terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit a uniform member/communications supervisor/shift supervisor monitoring the suspect apprehension pursuit, must continually assess public safety factors (as per PCC SOP).

During a suspect apprehension pursuit, a uniform member shall continually reassess the public safety factors and update the PCC at regular intervals. A uniform member shall terminate the pursuit when the risk to public safety exceeds that which may result if an individual in a fleeing motor vehicle is not immediately apprehended.

Notification of Suspect Apprehension Pursuit: A uniform member shall notify the PCC upon initiating a suspect apprehension pursuit and the communicator shall immediately notify the communications and shift supervisors that a suspect apprehension pursuit has been initiated.

A communicator or shift supervisor shall order a uniform member to terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit if, in their opinion, the risk to public safety that may result from the pursuit, outweighs the risk to public safety that may result if an individual in a fleeing motor vehicle is not immediately apprehended.

Alternatives: A uniform member shall not initiate or continue a suspect apprehension pursuit where any alternatives are readily available and capable of affecting the apprehension of the fleeing motor vehicle. Alternatives include, but are not limited to:

• Termination-and apprehend at another time
• Use of tire deflation devices-spike belt
• Rolling blocks
• Pinning
• Or intentional contact

Prior to initiating a suspect apprehension pursuit, uniform members shall consider the options presented in Alternative Stopping policy.

When determining which alternative to employ, the uniform member shall consider public and police officer safety and the immediate need to apprehend.

Restrictions: …except as approved by a communications supervisor or shift supervisor:

• Only two OPP vehicles shall be directly involved in a suspect apprehension pursuit
• An unmarked or low profile police vehicle shall not be used in a suspect apprehension pursuit unless authorized by a communications supervisor and these units shall relinquish their position when a marked pursuit rated vehicle becomes available

Stopping a Fleeing Motor Vehicle: A uniform member may only intentionally cause a police motor vehicle to come into physical contact with the fleeing motor vehicle for the purpose of stopping it, where the uniform member believes on reasonable grounds that to do so is necessary to immediately protect against loss of life or serious bodily harm.

In considering this course of action, the uniform member shall assess the impact of the action on the safety of members of the public and police officers.

Notwithstanding all other requirements set out in this section, any uniform member may cause a police motor vehicle to come into physical contact with the fleeing motor vehicle for the purpose of pinning it, if the fleeing motor vehicle has lost control or collided with an object and come to a stop and the driver of the motor vehicle continues to try to use it to flee.

Nothing precludes a uniform member involved in a pursuit, with assistance from other police officers in marked pursuit rated vehicles, from attempting to safely position the police vehicles in such a manner as to prevent the movement either forward, backward or sideways of the fleeing motor vehicle.

Management and Control: The responsibility for the safe control of a suspect apprehension pursuit rests with all uniform member(s), communicator, communications supervisor and shift supervisor.

The communications supervisor has the final decision-making responsibility for the safe control of a suspect apprehension pursuit.

The decision to terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit may be made by any uniform member, their shift supervisor or the communications supervisor.

Responsibilities-Uniform Member: in addition to compliance with regulations and policy set out in Police Orders, upon commencing a suspect apprehension pursuit, a uniform member shall:

• Advise the PCC of the suspect apprehension pursuit and nature of the offence that initiated the pursuit, and need for immediate apprehension, and ensure that emergency lights and siren are activated
• Comply with any direction of a communications supervisor or shift supervisor, and
• Provide the communicator with continuous information on:
  • Speed of suspect vehicle
  • Description of suspect vehicle
  • Location
  • Direction of travel
  • The manner in which the fleeing motor vehicle is being operated, including the traffic offences, from the time of initiating the suspect apprehension pursuit and identification of the motor vehicle

Unless authorized by a communications supervisor, only uniform members in the initial pursuing unit and the assigned back-up unit shall pursue a suspect fleeing in a vehicle. Uniform members in other units shall stay clear of the pursuit and off the pursuit route. Units not assigned to the pursuit shall remain alert to its progress and location.

Not initiate/Terminate: A uniform member does not breach the code of conduct when the uniform member decides not to initiate or chooses to terminate a suspect apprehension pursuit because the uniform member has reason to believe that the risk to public safety that may result from the pursuit outweighs the risk to public safety that may result if an individual in a fleeing motor vehicle is not immediately apprehended.

Responsibilities –Communicator: A communicator shall, upon receiving notification of a suspect apprehension pursuit, immediately assume notification and other related responsibilities (as per PCC SOP).

Responsibilities-Communications/Shift Supervisor: Notwithstanding a shift supervisor is available, the communications supervisor shall be considered in control of a suspect apprehension pursuit.

A communications supervisor, having been notified by the communicator of a suspect apprehension pursuit in progress, shall, in co-operation with the shift supervisor, assume related responsibilities (as per PCC SOP).

Training: No employee shall take part in a suspect apprehension pursuit in any manner unless they have received training accredited by the Ministry of the Community Safety and Correctional Services.

Sections 219, 220 and 221, Criminal Code - Criminal negligence Causing Death or Bodily Harm

219(1)Every one is criminally negligent who

1. in doing anything, or
2. in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do, shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons

(2)For the purposes of this section, duty means a duty imposed by law

220Every person who by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable

1. where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years, and
2. in any other case, to imprisonment for life

221 Every one who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Section 249, Criminal Code - Dangerous operation of motor vehicles, vessels and aircraft

249 (1) Every one commits an offence who operates

1. a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place&hellip

(2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1)

1. is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
2. is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction

(3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes bodily harm to any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

(4) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes the death of any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

On September 25, 2017, Complainant #2, while operating a stolen motor vehicle and being pursued by three Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) vehicles operated by Subject Officer (SO) #1, SO #2, and SO #3, struck a motor vehicle being operated by Complainant #1, killing her. Complainant #2 was injured in the collision. The police pursuit of Complainant #2 covered some 12.4 kilometres in total, over a time period spanning approximately six minutes and 30 seconds, with the police vehicles reaching speeds up to 127.1 km/h and covering a distance from Highway 17 at Calobogie Road in the Township of McNab/Braeside and terminating at the intersection of Daniel Street South and Edey Street in the Town of Arnprior, where the pick-up truck being operated by Complainant #2 struck the motor vehicle being operated by Complainant #1, killing her.

During the course of this investigation, 42 civilian witnesses (CWs) were interviewed, while one additional witness provided a written statement and one was recorded in a 911 call. Additionally, ten police witnesses were interviewed and provided their memorandum book notes to the SIU investigators for review. All three of the subject police officers declined to be interviewed or to provide their notes for review, as is their legal right.

In addition to the witnesses interviewed, SIU investigators had access to, and reviewed, numerous CCTV videos from commercial premises en route, recordings of the 911 calls and police transmissions, two accident reconstruction reports, and an abundance of raw data from the involved motor vehicles all of which was thoroughly reviewed and resulted in a time/distance analysis of each of the involved motor vehicles at various points plotted along the route of the pursuit which culminated in the collision with Complainant #1’s motor vehicle in the Town of Arnprior. Despite neither Complainant #2 nor the three subject officers consenting to an interview, a clear picture of events was able to be pieced together from the abundance of information gathered. There is no dispute as to the facts.

The following narrative was derived from all of the gathered evidence during the course of this investigation:

From Facebook messages posted by Complainant #2, prior to the theft of the motor vehicle ultimately involved in the police pursuit and the death of Complainant #1, it is clear that Complainant #2 was intent on inflicting violence, if not death, on a number of persons.

Specifically, Complainant #2 indicated in his messages the following:

• “I’ll murder that whole fucking family”
• “I’m going through one of my moods and I really want to do something fucking stupid. They have 3 or 4 kids and I’ll kill ‘em too.”
• “I don’t really care who gets killed but I thought I’d target one family… I don’t want to be alive but I’m taking people with me.”
• “Thinking about killing people and myself every day is fucking get to me and I have to act on it before it drives me fucking nuts.”

At approximately 7:15 a.m. on September 25, 2017, CW #20 parked his silver/grey Ford F-150 pick-up truck in a vacant parking lot across the street from the Eganville Community Arena, leaving the truck unlocked and the ignition key in the centre console. When he returned to the parking lot at 3:00 p.m. to retrieve his truck, it was missing. He then notified the OPP that his truck had been stolen.

Following the call from CW #20, SO #2, Witness Officer (WO) #6, WO #9, SO #3 and SO #1 all advised that they would head to the area to look for the stolen motor vehicle.

When the call went out to be on the look-out for the stolen pick-up truck from the Eganville Community Centre, WO #8 almost immediately advised that it should be kept in mind that Complainant #2 lived in the area where the truck had been stolen and WO #9 advised that he had seen Complainant #2 walking in the area an hour earlier.

The first 911 call, from CW #42, came in at 2:59 p.m., reporting that she had observed an older model silver Ford pick-up truck with a dark stripe on the bottom and an extended cab with dark swirls on its side, travelling toward Grist Mill Road in Eganville. CW #42 went on to report that the truck had nearly been involved in a head-on collision with a dump truck and an SUV. The driver of the Ford pick-up truck had forced the SUV onto the sidewalk and then given everyone ‘the finger.’

At 3:33 p.m., CW #36 called 911 to report that he was near Veterans Memorial Boulevard just past the police station in Renfrew and that he had seen a man driving a silver Ford half-ton truck the wrong way on the boulevard and he was pushing people off the road. He described the truck as travelling at 70 to 80 miles per hour toward Highway 17.

Simultaneously, another 911 call was received from an undesignated witness, who reported that a kid driving a silver half-ton passed her driving on the wrong side of the road and the driver was travelling at 100 miles per hour, in town, and had almost hit two high school kids.

At 3:34 p.m., a 911 call was received from CW #10 to report a young man driving recklessly on Plaunt Street in Renfrew in an older pick-up truck with stripes on the side. She reported that the pick-up truck came out of the Rexall parking lot and CW #10 had to swerve across the driveway to avoid being struck by the driver of the truck. She further indicated that the driver did not stop but went roaring across Hall Street, through a stop sign, without looking. The driver gave CW #10 ‘the finger’ because she was apparently in his way and then took the off ramp at O’Brien Road, travelling the wrong way, and almost got hit by a dump truck, following which he went flying northeast toward Highway 17.

At 3:35 p.m., CW #36 made a second 911 call to report that he had travelled to Highway 17 but could not see the driver of the pick-up truck, but that the driver had been travelling at a high rate of speed, was driving the wrong way on Memorial Boulevard, and was whipping back and forth.

The information from these calls was passed on to the involved police officers by the communications dispatcher.

Based on the evidence of the civilian witnesses who were either interviewed, provided written statements, or were recorded calling in on the 911 emergency line, there is absolutely no question that Complainant #2 was operating the Ford pick-up truck in an extremely dangerous fashion and that he was putting the lives of both pedestrians and other motorists at risk of harm or death.

Numerous witnesses indicated that Complainant #2 narrowly avoided a number of motor vehicle collisions only because others took evasive action, with Complainant #2 often forcing those vehicles off the road and/or up onto the sidewalk, frequently driving in the oncoming lanes of traffic, purposely sideswiping another motor vehicle, failing to stop for red lights or stop signs, driving at excessive rates of speed, driving erratically, swerving across the lanes, and on occasion driving on the sidewalk, the centre median, or the front lawns of residences.

Of specific note is the evidence of CW #46, who observed Complainant #2’s driving and surmised that he was being pursued by police, so she pulled over to get out of the way, but in fact, he was not being pursued at that time. CW #46 professed that she believed that Complainant #2 was likely going to hurt or kill someone.

CW #11 indicated that after he was forced onto the sidewalk in order to avoid a head-on collision with Complainant #2, Complainant #2 turned the truck around, passed CW #11’s SUV on the sidewalk to the right of the roadway, before purposely sideswiping his vehicle. CW #11 indicated that at no time during his interaction with the pick-up truck did he see or hear any OPP vehicles. He also surmised that the police had no choice but to follow Complainant #2 as it appeared to him that the driver had a mission and, despite the tragic subsequent death of Complainant #1, it could have been a lot worse with Complainant #2 possibly killing far more people.

The driver of the pick-up truck, Complainant #2, was routinely described by witnesses as angry, slamming on his brakes and then accelerating, forcing other vehicles to stop or slow, and he continuously had his arm out the window giving both pedestrians and other motorists ‘the finger’, with one witness specifically indicating that he was communicating a loud and clear “Fuck you!”

At 3:35:01 p.m., the CCTV video from the Squeaky Kleen Auto Spa at 470 O’Brien Road in Renfrew revealed that the stolen pick-up truck travelled in the centre turning lane at a high rate of speed, passing several vehicles, including a transport truck, and then continued on in the curb lane. It is clear that no police vehicles were following Complainant #2 at that time.

At 3:39 p.m., the communications recording reveals that WO #3 observed the truck at Lochwinnoch Road travelling eastbound on Highway 17, and he had just passed her.

At 3:40 p.m., SO #3 was heard to transmit, “If it’s him, (Complainant #2) he’s threatened suicide by police before.”

At 3:44 p.m., WO #3 confirmed that the licence plate on the truck was the same as on the truck that had been stolen in Eganville. She further advised that she was in an unmarked vehicle, and that she had no means by which to stop the truck. The dispatcher was heard to ask WO #3 to try a controlled rolling block and requested a road supervisor. SO #2 was then heard to respond that the police officers would attempt the rolling block and she asked WO #5 if he was ahead and could deploy the spike belt, if the rolling block was unsuccessful.

At 3:45 p.m., WO #3 updated her location as just approaching Calabogie Road and McLean Drive and SO #2 advised that they were not too far behind. WO #3 estimated the speed of the pick-up truck and her own vehicle at that time as being “Just 100 km/h”’ and “Not going too fast.” Moments later, WO #3 advised that they were now stuck behind a school bus and two other civilian vehicles and that they had just passed Calabogie and had slowed to 80 km/h.

At 3:46 p.m., WO #4 asked if there was a communications sergeant monitoring the call, and it was confirmed that there was. WO #4 further confirmed that until that point, no uniform vehicles had been involved. As such, although the three police cruisers had been reaching high rates of speed in order to locate the stolen motor vehicle, it is clear that their actions did not in any way influence the actions of Complainant #2, as he was unaware of them.

SO #2 then confirmed that they were approaching and that they could see the school bus. She directed that once they got closer, all three uniform cars were to shut off their emergency lighting system and sirens.

During the time frame beginning at 3:46:06 p.m. until 3:48:12 p.m., wherein the three police cruisers first appear to be approaching Complainant #2’s motor vehicle, and could therefore be considered to be engaging him in a vehicular pursuit, the average speed of the three police cruisers was determined to be between 120.9 and 125.2 km/h while they travelled between Calabogie Road and Scheel Drive on Highway 17, which had a posted speed limit of 100 km/h. Prior to this point in time, while WO #3 was following Complainant #2 in her unmarked vehicle, it is clear that there was no pursuit, as she at no time attempted to stop him and there is no evidence that he was aware of her presence, as she had neither lights nor sirens on her police vehicle.

The transmission recording then reveals that SO #2 directed, “It’s going to come up to a passing lane and we’re just going to try and stagger ourselves so we can get one in front, one behind, and one beside, and we will try to stop the vehicle that way.” The communications recording confirms that the police sirens are heard in the background at that time.

SO #1 confirmed that he had received the direction from SO #2, and SO #3 confirmed, at 3:47 p.m., that her emergency lighting system was now off.

SO #2 then indicated that they were about six cars behind the stolen truck and she transmitted to SO #1, “(SO #1), you’re going to go in front. I‘ll try and stay beside, (SO #3), you can come up from behind me. (WO #5), (Highway) 17 and White lake if you want to get a spike belt ready.”

At that point, WO #3 indicated that she was moving to the passing lane and SO #2 directed, “If you feel like you’re going to get hit by this vehicle, just get out of the way and we’ll just try and follow behind and let (WO #5) get him with a spike belt.” WO #3 indicated that she was travelling at 110 km/h at that point on Hwy 17.

At 3:48 p.m., SO #2 transmitted to WO #3, “Okay, just back off (WO #3), we’re going to try and position ourselves around it. (SO #1), you call it from here because you’re right behind him, okay?”

At that point, SO #1 responded that the stolen pick-up truck had just locked up his brakes and SO #2 told SO #1 to get out of the way and to back off from it a little. She then directed WO #5 to get ready with the spike belt.

The locking up of the brakes by the pick-up truck rendered the rolling block measure ineffective.

A transmission from an unidentified officer directed that when SO #1 caught up to the truck, he should hold the traffic back.

Between 3:48:08 p.m. and 3:50:15 p.m., the average speed of the three marked police vehicles was determined to be between 118.6 and 127.1 km/h between Scheel Drive and Campbell Drive on Highway 17, which was still a posted 100 km/h zone primarily made up of farmland and forest.

At 3:48:38 p.m., SO #2’s police cruiser made contact with the rear of SO #1’s police cruiser in the eastbound passing lane of Highway 17, approximately 0.80 km east of Scheel Drive, presumably as a result of the failed rolling block manoeuvre, wherein the three police cruisers tried to surround the stolen pick-up truck, but it braked suddenly, causing the lead vehicle, SO #1, to also brake sharply resulting in SO #2 making contact with SO #1’s rear bumper.

At 3:49 p.m., SO #1 indicated that the driver of the truck was not letting him by and SO #2 again advised SO #1 to back off a bit and follow from a distance. SO #2 then advised the dispatcher that there had been some contact between the front of her vehicle and the rear of SO #1’s vehicle, but that both were fine and still driving. SO #1 said to give him a bit of space.

At 3:49 p.m., WO #7 told WO #4 that he would get in front of the truck and that WO #4 could then blow past WO #7; this was acknowledged by WO #4.

SO #2 then reported that they had passed WO #5 and that they were just going by Campbell Road. “He’s in lane two and he’s a little bit all over the roadway here, we’re going about 125. I’ll let you know when we’re getting the right lane. We got one car in both lanes so you’ll be able to see. We will flick on our lights whenever we get to see you. 10-4?”

At 3:50 p.m., WO #5 indicated that he was at the overpass at White Lake Road and WO #7 indicated that he was at Campbell Road slowing traffic down by ‘splitting the lanes’ (which I assume means that he was driving partially in each lane, in order that other traffic not be able to pass). SO #1 indicated that there was one minivan in front of the stolen truck and that they were travelling at about 120 km/h.

Between 3:50:08 p.m. and 3:51:50 p.m., the three involved police vehicles were determined to be travelling at average speeds ranging between 101.6 and 111.6 km/h in the area from Campbell Drive to Daniel Street South on Hwy 17.

At 3:51 p.m., the communications supervisor, WO #1, asked if all lights and sirens were on or off, and SO #1 indicated that they were all off.

The stolen pick-up truck then exited Highway 417 at the White Lake Road exit, thereby avoiding the spike belt which WO #5 had deployed across the highway.

SO #2 reported that the truck was exiting at White Lake Road and she asked SO #1 to pull in front of the truck at the stop light, but not to get too close. SO #2 next transmitted that the truck had failed to stop at the red light and she asked WO #1 for direction as to what should be done at that point. SO #2 further informed WO #1 that the truck was now driving on the wrong side of the highway on the overpass, to which WO #1 responded that this was now a “wrong way vehicle” (pursuant to the OPP procedure guidelines) and “We’re going to do everything we can to stop it. I am permitting you to use intentional contact, since it’s a dangerous driver.”

CW #25 observed the pick-up truck go through the red light and turn left onto White Lake Road travelling on the wrong side of the median and facing oncoming traffic, forcing other vehicles to either stop or move off of the roadway. Approximately five seconds later, CW #25 observed four or five marked OPP vehicles, with their emergency lighting equipment activated, follow the truck through the red light, but enter the proper lane of traffic on the other side of the centre median from Complainant #2 and the pick-up truck.

Between 3:51:50 p.m. and 3:52:43 p.m., the three subject police cruisers were travelling at average speeds of 58.3 to 79.8 km/h northbound along Daniel Street South from Highway 17 toward Edey Street. The posted speed limit in this area is 60 km/h, reducing to 50 km/h, and then to 40 km/h at Baskin Drive. This is an area with numerous commercial buildings on both sides of the road which then becomes a mixed commercial/residential area terminating at Edey Street. Various civilian witnesses observed the police vehicles following the pick-up truck, with the three police cars travelling one behind the other. The evidence varied between witnesses as to whether the lights or sirens or both were activated on the pursuing police vehicles. The police cars, while described as travelling in excess of the speed limit, were described as travelling at a lesser rate of speed than was the pick-up truck.

At 3:52 p.m., SO #2 reported, “We’re coming into a heavily populated area. (SO #1), if you get an opportunity, take it. Be mindful of pedestrians.” WO #1 was then heard to ask the officer to let her know if there were any pedestrians or school buses in the area.

At 3:52:25 p.m., SO #1 responded that there were pedestrians and that they were entering a construction zone.

At 3:52:30 p.m., WO #1 directed, “We’re going to have to terminate then. Terminate, all units pull over, will advise …” At which point SO #1 cut in, and reported, “He’s just gone head on into another vehicle,” and “It’s a collision! It’s a collision!”

The stolen pick-up truck was observed driving northbound on Daniel Street South speeding toward the intersection with Edey Street at a speed described as at least 90 km/h. Complainant #1 was stopped at that the same intersection, waiting to proceed southbound on Daniel Street South. Complainant #1 slowly began to move forward, into the intersection, just as the pick-up truck approached the intersection. The construction flag person ran out of the way of the pick-up truck and ran toward the east curb, just as the pick-up truck collided with the front driver side of Complainant #1’s stopped motor vehicle. The pick-up truck then separated from Complainant #1’s car and careened into a construction truck parked in the area, before finally coming to a stop.

CW #8, who was on Daniel Street South, pulled over and stopped as he observed the stolen pick-up truck travelling toward him at a high rate of speed, which he estimated in excess of 100 km/h. He observed a marked police cruiser travelling closely behind the truck, but he believed that it was braking as it passed him. CW #8 looked in his rear view mirror and observed the pick-up truck strike Complainant #1’s vehicle.

CW #48, who was waiting to turn left from Daniel Street South onto Edey Street, observed the pick-up truck travelling toward her and she immediately veered to the right to avoid a collision. She observed the truck to be travelling the wrong way in the oncoming lane of traffic, and she estimated that the truck was travelling at about 120 km/h. She indicated that the truck made no effort to stop at the intersection and at no time did she see his brake lights activated; within seconds, she heard the crash. She estimated that when she first saw the pick-up truck until she observed the first police cruiser, at least ten seconds had passed and that the police cruiser was three to four car lengths behind the pick-up truck and appeared to be travelling at a lesser speed than was the truck.

CW #5, who observed the collision, estimated that 45 seconds passed between when he heard the crush of metal and when he saw the first police vehicle arrive, while CW #7 and CW #17 both put the time between the collision and the arrival of police at within one minute, with CW #23 placing it at one minute. On the other hand, CW #6 put it closer to six seconds and CW #31 placed the time lapse between when the pick-up truck finally came to a stop and the arrival of the first police car at five seconds.

According to the accident reconstruction analysis, the Ford pick-up truck was travelling on Daniel Street South from the Tim Hortons to slightly north of the Canadian Tire store at an average speed of between 102.7 and 112.5 km/h. At the time that the pick-up truck made contact with the Chevrolet Aveo driven by Complainant #1, the pick-up truck was still moving at a minimum speed of 75.2 km/h; although the pick-up truck had not slowed prior to the collision, when it made contact with the near stationary Aveo, it was forced to decelerate.

While the pick-up truck, as it progressed on Daniel Street South, went from a speed of 102 km/h at the Tim Hortons store, 800 metres from the collision scene, and then increased to 112 km/h at the Home Hardware, located 490 metres from the collision scene, and then slightly reduced its speed to 109 at the Canadian Tire store, 420 metres from the collision scene, the three police vehicles were steadily reducing their speed as they neared the intersection of Daniel Street South and Edey Street, with SO #1’s cruiser having slowed from 102 to 99 km/h, while SO #2’s cruiser slowed from 102 to 71 km/h and SO #3 slowed from 102 to 68 km/h by the time they had reached the Canadian Tire store.

While the lack of data with respect to the speed of SO #1’s cruiser (due to a technical issue) as he neared the intersection of Daniel Street South and Edey Street prevented an accurate analysis of his speed, it appears clear that all three police cruisers were slowing, while the pick-up truck was not. The AVL data from the cruisers of SO #2 and SO #3 confirmed that their vehicles continued to slow after they passed the Canadian Tire store, with SO #2 having reduced her speed to 70.8 km/h when she came to be 139 metres from the collision scene, while SO #3 reduced her speed to 67.6 km/h and continued to slow to 51.5 km/h as she neared to within 50 metres of the collision scene.

Having reviewed all of the extensive evidence from the many civilian and police witnesses who observed the Complainant’s driving on the afternoon of September 25, 2017, there is no question that Complainant #2 posed a real and imminent danger to the lives and/or safety of anyone who came within range of the stolen motor vehicle that he was driving. Unlike many other police pursuit investigations, this is not a matter of a police officer deciding between stopping a motor vehicle in order to investigate the driver for an HTA offence or to execute a Criminal Code warrant, or allowing him to flee and to be arrested on another day.

It is clear that Complainant #2, before police ever came to either look for him or to follow him, according to the many witnesses who came forward and the many recorded 911 calls, posed a real and imminent threat to the various communities through which he was driving on that afternoon, and that the police had no choice but to make every effort to stop him before he killed someone.

It is clear from the police transmission recording that police resorted to a number of strategic options to stop Complainant #2, including a rolling stop manoeuvre, the deployment of a spike belt, and an attempt to ram his vehicle, all of which, unfortunately, were unsuccessful due to the evasive actions of Complainant #2.

It is further clear that police could not stand idly by and allow Complainant #2 to continue driving in the fashion that he was, while he put numerous other motorists and pedestrians at risk.

While it is evident that the three police cruisers, manned by SO #1, SO #2, and SO #3, were all engaged in a vehicular pursuit of Complainant #2, it is equally evident that they had few other options available to them in order to stop Complainant #2’s erratic and dangerous driving behaviour and to safeguard the people in the communities through which he was travelling. Based on the evidence of various witnesses to Complainant #2’s driving, it was not a question of if, but when, Complainant #2 was going to seriously injure or kill someone. It was the duty of the police officers to safeguard those communities, which they could not do without stopping Complainant #2, which, when all else failed, required a vehicular pursuit.

I note that all of the officers involved in attempting to stop Complainant #2 did so in full compliance with Ontario Regulation 266/10 of the Ontario Police Services Act entitled Suspect Apprehension Pursuits, in that they notified and were in constant contact with the communications supervisor, they constantly updated the supervisor as to the location and speed of Complainant #2 and their own police vehicles, they resorted to alternative measures, other than a pursuit, to try and stop Complainant #2, and they constantly reassessed the determination made to initiate a pursuit and whether or not to discontinue the pursuit if the risk to public safety that may result from the pursuit outweighed the risk to public safety that may result if an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle was not immediately apprehended.

Despite each of the three subject officers declining to provide a statement, I have inferred their state of mind with respect to their assessment as to the risk to public safety from a number of their actions as follows:

• When Complainant #2 entered onto Highway 17 at White Lake Road and he drove on the wrong side of the cement centre median, despite the desire of the officers to stop Complainant #2, I assume that they felt it was too dangerous to drive on the wrong side of the road into oncoming traffic, opting instead to remain on the right side of the road and try and cut him off once the centre median ended
• They resorted to alternative measures, including a rolling stop manoeuvre and the deployment of a spike belt, to try and stop Complainant #2
• They sought direction from the communications supervisor as to next steps when Complainant #2 failed to stop at the red light
• They advised the communications supervisor when they came into a more populated area where there were pedestrians, and
• When they entered the more populated area, they immediately began to slow and appeared to be following the supervisor’s direction to terminate the pursuit

Despite finding that I have reasonable grounds to believe that the three subject officers fully complied with the Suspect Apprehension Pursuit Policy, pursuant to the Ontario Police Services Act, the question remains whether, on these facts, there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the officers involved in the pursuit of Complainant #2 committed a criminal offence, specifically, whether or not the driving rose to the level of being dangerous and therefore in contravention of s.249 (1) of the Criminal Code and did thereby cause bodily harm contrary to s.249 (3) or death contrary to s. 249 (4) or if it amounted to criminal negligence contrary to s.219 of the Criminal Code and did thereby cause death contrary to s. 220 or bodily harm contrary to s.221.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Beatty, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, defines s.249 as requiring that the driving be dangerous to the public, having regard to all of the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that, at the time, is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place” and the driving must be such that it amounts to “a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances.” While the offence under s.219 requires “a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver in circumstances” where the accused “showed a reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others” (R v Sharp (1984), 12 CCC(3d) 428 Ont CA).

On a review of all of the evidence, while it is clear that the officers were, at times, all travelling at speeds in excess of the posted speed limit, I accept that while pursuing Complainant #2, their speeds never exceeded 127.1 km/h in a 100 km/h zone, which, on a rural highway, I find is likely no more than slightly above the normal flow of traffic. Additionally, when they entered a more populated area, they immediately and consistently began to decrease their speed, and they terminated the pursuit when it appeared obvious that to continue would pose a danger to the community.

I also find that while Complainant #2’s manner of driving posed an immediate and significant danger to others, both motorists and pedestrians, it is beyond dispute that the dangerous nature of his driving preceded any involvement by police and that their pursuit of the vehicle in which he was driving did not appear to exacerbate his driving, but rather he simply continued on in the same manner as he had already been reported to be driving, as evidenced in the five 911 calls which preceded any involvement by the police.

Furthermore, I note that despite Complainant #2’s choice of driving on the wrong side of the highway, into oncoming traffic, the police officers attempting to stop him chose not to do so, opting instead to drive on the correct side of the road in order to minimize the danger to other motorists.

I am also unable to find any causal connection between the driving of Complainant #2 and the actions of the police, in that it appears that the police pursuit did nothing to influence Complainant #2’s manner of driving and he simply carried on in the dangerous and reckless manner in which he had already been driving before police even became involved.

Additionally, I find that there is no evidence that the driving by any of the police officers created a danger to other users of the roadway or that at any time they interfered with other traffic. Rather, I find that their driving posed a far lesser danger to other motorists than did the driving of Complainant #2. In fact, it appears that they posed no danger at all in that vehicles and pedestrians who had already driven off the road, or onto the sidewalk, or who had jumped out of the way of the pick-up truck, were not influenced by the driving of the three police cruisers in any fashion.

I fully accept as accurate the opinions of the various CWs that Complainant #2 was going to kill someone, if not stopped by police. While I am unable, in the absence of some input from Complainant #2, to determine whether or not he deliberately intended to cause a loss of life by his manner of driving, it is clear that he had an utter disregard for the lives and safety of those with whom he came into contact and if it was not his intent to deliberately kill someone, he was clearly reckless as to whether or not he caused a death, either with or without the involvement of police, and he showed an utter disregard for human life.

On all of the evidence before me, I cannot find any connection between the actions of the police in attempting to stop Complainant #2, who was a clear and imminent danger to the lives of others, and the tragic loss of life of Complainant #1, or the injuries to Complainant #2 himself. On this record, it is clear that Complainant #2 chose to drive in a manner which was extremely dangerous to others and had no regard for the possible loss of life that his driving would inevitably lead to, both before and after he came to the attention of police. I have no hesitation in finding that had police never intervened and attempted to stop Complainant #2, there is still a very strong likelihood that he could have injured or killed many more.

While it is unfortunate that police were unable to stop Complainant #2 while they were still out on the highway, away from more populated areas, and before the tragic death of Complainant #1, on all of the evidence, I accept that the three subject officers, and all of the officers who attempted to bring Complainant #2 to a stop, used their best efforts in what was a very fast paced and dynamic situation, with little time for planning out strategies, which efforts unfortunately were not enough to stop Complainant #2, who was intent on causing as much harm as possible.

I find on this evidence that the driving of the police officers involved in the pursuit and attempt to apprehend Complainant #2 does not rise to the level of driving required to constitute ‘a marked departure from the norm’ and even less so ‘a marked and substantial departure from the norm’ and there is no evidence to establish any causal connection between the actions of the pursuing officers and the motor vehicle collision that tragically took the life of Complainant #1.

As such, I find that there is no evidence upon which I can form reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal offence has been committed by any of the police officers in their efforts to stop Complainant #2, and therefore no charges will issue.

Date: July 12, 2018

Original signed by

Tony Loparco
Director
Special Investigations Unit