Director's Report Details

The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving police officers where there has been death, serious injury or allegations of sexual assault. The Unit’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.

Under the Police Services Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether an officer has committed a criminal offence in connection with the incident under investigation. If, after an investigation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the officer. Alternatively, in all cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director does not lay criminal charges but files a report with the Attorney General communicating the results of an investigation.

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)

Pursuant to section 14 of FIPPA (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

• Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and
• Information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding. 

Pursuant to section 21 of FIPPA (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this document. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

• Subject Officer name(s);
• Witness Officer name(s);
• Civilian Witness name(s);
• Location information; 
• Witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence; and 
• Other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation.

Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (“PHIPA”)

Pursuant to PHIPA, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may have also been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

The Unit’s investigative jurisdiction is limited to those incidents where there is a serious injury (including sexual assault allegations) or death in cases involving the police.

“Serious injuries” shall include those that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. “Serious Injury” shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide on the extent of its involvement.

This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the death of Ejaz Choudry.

Notification of the SIU

On Saturday, June 20, 2020, at 9:12 p.m., the Peel Regional Police (PRP) notified the SIU of the firearms-death of Mr. Ejaz Choudry.

The PRP advised that on Saturday, June 20, 2020, at 8:30 p.m., the PRP was asked to do a residence check for a patient who was off his medication and had wandered away from the hospital. The patient was a 62-year-old man [now determined to be Mr. Choudry] living at 3425 Morning Star Drive in Mississauga. PRP contacted Mr. Choudry’s family and police officers attended the apartment with the family. They found Mr. Choudry in a second-floor unit, kneeling on a prayer rug and armed with two knives. When Mr. Choudry was asked to drop the weapons, he refused. The police officers and family members left the apartment.

The PRP Tactical Response Unit (TRU) was called in and took over the scene as a barricaded person incident. It established some communication with Mr. Choudry and then communications broke down. After 20 minutes of silence from Mr. Choudry, the TRU breached the balcony door and deployed an Anti-Riot Weapon ENfield (ARWEN) [1] and a Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW). Both met with negative results. Mr. Choudry would not drop the knives and was subsequently shot. Paramedics responded and Mr. Choudry was pronounced dead remotely by a physician from Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. The coroner was said to be attending.

The Scene

The scene was located in a second-floor unit at 3425 Morning Star Drive. The building was a multilevel apartment building on the northwest corner of Morning Star Drive and Goreway Drive. There were two wings to the building, one stretched west along Morning Star Drive and the other wing stretched north along Goreway Drive.

The incident occurred in an apartment which had a balcony. There were two ladders leaning against the railing of the apartment’s balcony. The balcony appeared cluttered with household items.




Figure 1 - Two ladders propped against the apartment's balcony.

Outside the apartment in the hallway there was some police equipment used to breach the door. There was a “Police” ballistic shield leaning against the wall next to the door. The door had been forced open but only the bottom half of the door gave way leaving the upper portion still partially in place.




Figure 2 - The broken door to the unit and police ballistic shield.

The SIU’s investigation into Mr. Choudry’s death consisted of interviews with nine civilian witnesses and 13 officers, including two officers who witnessed the shooting. The investigation also benefitted from video recordings that captured the movements of police on the balcony and in the hallway outside the apartment, along with forensic evidence and medical information about Mr. Choudry. The SO, as was his legal right, did not submit to an interview with SIU investigators or produce a copy of his duty notes. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered was primarily consistent in all material respects.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. of June 20, 2020, Mr. Choudry’s daughter, CW #1, called Emergency Medical Service’s non-emergency line to request medical assistance for Mr. Choudry. Mr. Choudry suffered from schizophrenia, was not taking his medication and was acting confused. CW #1 reported that Mr. Choudry had previously been hospitalized for psychiatric care but had left the hospital under unknown circumstances. CW #1 also told the dispatcher that Mr. Choudry had a small pocket-knife but was not dangerous. The EMS dispatcher notified the PRP, and the PRP requested Mr. Choudry’s family evacuate the apartment as a precaution.

The paramedics were first to arrive at Mr. Choudry’s apartment, followed by WO #1 and WO #4 at approximately 5:30 p.m. The officers, paramedics and CW #1 attended the hallway outside of the apartment. WO #4 tried to speak with Mr. Choudry through the door, but Mr. Choudry told the officers to leave.

CW #1 and the two officers entered the apartment, with CW #1 staying behind the officers at their request. WO #4 had her CEW drawn and WO #1 had his hand on the holster of his firearm. The officers located Mr. Choudry in a bedroom seated on a prayer mat on the floor. WO #4 tried to reassure Mr. Choudry that the police were with paramedics to help and requested he show them the pocket-knife. Mr. Choudry told the officers to leave and began praying. CW #1 translated into Punjabi the officers’ request to see the knife and Mr. Choudry retrieved a large kitchen knife from under his prayer mat. [5] Mr. Choudry held the knife at eye level with the blade pointing towards the officers. He again told the officers to leave.

WO #4 requested that everyone leave the apartment and the officers staged themselves outside the apartment door. WO #13, a supervising officer, arrived and requested the TRU team attend. [6] The officers continued their attempts to negotiate with Mr. Choudry. CW #1, joined by CW #3, also attempted to speak with Mr. Choudry from the hallway, asking him to come out and give the police the knife so the police did not feel threatened. Mr. Choudry opened the door for a brief period without exiting the apartment before he closed the door and locked it. He said he would not come out because he thought the police would shoot him.

At around 6:00 p.m., TRU members WO #3, WO #5, WO #6 and WO #11 arrived and took control of the scene. The family was asked to go downstairs and to not communicate with Mr. Choudry. The officers stood near the door and continued to reassure Mr. Choudry that the paramedics were there to help. A tactical shield was placed against the front door to act as a barrier if Mr. Choudry exited the apartment unexpectedly. Mr. Choudry was difficult to understand but at times responded in English, telling the officers he was not going to open the door and to go away. WO #13 requested that a Punjabi-speaking officer attend the scene. WO #11 also requested a Duty Inspector [7] and a police service dog. At around 6:45 p.m., several more officers arrived on scene including Punjabi-speaking officer, WO #9, and Duty Inspector, WO #11. A second TRU team consisting of the SO, WO #2 and WO #8 also had arrived. [8]

WO #9 stood outside the apartment door and, at the direction of TRU members, spoke with Mr. Choudry in Punjabi. According to WO #9, he told Mr. Choudry that the police were there to help him. Mr. Choudry told him to go away and that the police could not help him. WO #9 explained that his family had called the police and asked him if he wanted to speak with his brother. [9] Mr. Choudry said he was frustrated with his family and called his brother an idiot. He did not answer when asked if he had a knife but confirmed that he had no intention of hurting himself. When asked if he had taken his medication, Mr. Choudry responded that he took all of it. Mr. Choudry then began to pray loudly in another language, potentially Arabic. WO #9 asked if the police could come in and Mr. Choudry stated words to the effect that the police needed a court order. He told the police that if they came in, they would watch what happens. WO #9 asked him to clarify this and Mr. Choudry repeated this statement.

While WO #9 spoke with Mr. Choudry, WO #10 gathered information about Mr. Choudry and formed an operational plan. The initial plan was to contain the apartment, keep other tenants safely sheltered and to negotiate Mr. Choudry’s apprehension under the Mental Health Act. This, and a reminder of officers’ authority to use force, was communicated over the radio to the responding officers. WO #10 learned that the apartment was accessible through the balcony door. Together with TRU team leaders, WO #10 crafted a Deliberate Action Plan (DAP) that involved one TRU team entering the apartment through the balcony door and, five seconds later, another TRU team entering through the apartment’s front door. [10] For the next half hour, WO #10 gathered more information about Mr. Choudry, learning of his multiple medical conditions. At 7:42 p.m., he requested a Crisis Negotiator Team (CNT) come to the scene but the CNT was about an hour away.

Sometime before 8:00 p.m., Mr. Choudry stopped responding to WO #9 and no movement could be heard within the apartment. After approximately 20 minutes [11] of Mr. Choudry being non-responsive, WO #10 decided to implement the DAP. The time was about 8:25 p.m. The SO, WO #2 and WO #8 used ladders to climb onto the balcony of the apartment. The SO was armed with a pistol and stood to the right of the balcony door. To his left were WO #2, armed with an ARWEN, and WO #8, armed with a CEW. The SO kicked in the balcony door, but it did not open fully. The door was kicked again and then pushed open by the SO. Mr. Choudry moved towards the officers holding a large kitchen knife. The officers yelled, “Put down the knife.” WO #8 discharged his CEW at Mr. Choudry to no avail. At about the same time, WO #2 discharged his ARWEN three times in quick succession followed by the SO discharging his pistol twice, striking Mr. Choudry in the chest.

After Mr. Choudry was shot, he backed into the apartment and fell onto the floor. When the officers entered the apartment, Mr. Choudry still had the knife in his hand. The officers commanded him to drop the knife and when Mr. Choudry did not do so, WO #2 discharged his ARWEN two more times at Mr. Choudry. WO #8 then delivered a hard kick to Mr. Choudry’s arm, resulting in the knife falling to the floor.

At this moment, the other TRU team breached the apartment through the apartment’s front door and paramedics rushed into the apartment to perform CPR on Mr. Choudry with the assistance of WO #2. Attempts to save Mr. Choudry’s life were unsuccessful and Mr. Choudry was pronounced dead at 8:38 p.m. 

Section 25(1), Criminal Code -- Protection of persons acting under authority

(a) as a private person,

(b) as a peace officer or public officer,

(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or

(d) by virtue of his office,

Sections 219 and 221, Criminal Code -- Criminal negligence causing death

(a) in doing anything, or

(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,

220 Every person who by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable

(a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and

(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.

In the evening of June 20, 2020, Ejaz Choudry was shot and killed by a PRP officer at 3425 Morning Star Drive in Mississauga. PRP officers were there to assist paramedics with Mr. Choudry, who was in mental distress. Mr. Choudry armed himself with a large kitchen knife and locked himself inside his apartment. The PRP attempted to negotiate with Mr. Choudry, but Mr. Choudry eventually stopped responding. Concerned that Mr. Choudry required immediate medical assistance, three members of the PRP’s TRU forcibly breached Mr. Choudry’s apartment through the door of his second-floor balcony. Thereafter, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that Mr. Choudry moved towards the officers while holding a large kitchen knife. After attempts to stop Mr. Choudry with a CEW and a firearm that fired rubber bullets were unsuccessful, the SO shot Mr. Choudry twice in the chest. Mr. Choudry died as a result of the shooting.

The two overarching questions with respect to the potential criminal liability of the involved officers are whether the SO, WO #2 and WO #8 used excessive force during their interaction with Mr. Choudry, and whether WO #10 was criminally negligent as the officer in charge of the police response. Following a thorough examination of the evidence, I am unable to form reasonable grounds to believe any PRP officer committed a criminal offence in relation to Mr. Choudry’s death.

To begin, I will consider whether the SO, WO #2 and WO #8 used excessive force. Subsections 25(1) and 25(3) of the Criminal Code dictate when police officers are permitted to use force, including lethal force. Section 25(1) states that a police officer is justified, if he or she acts on reasonable grounds, in using as much force as necessary in the execution of a lawful duty. Section 25(3) clarifies that a police officer is only permitted to use force likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that lethal force is necessary to preserve themselves or others from death or grievous bodily harm.

I accept that the PRP officers were acting within the execution of their lawful duties when they accompanied paramedics to Mr. Choudry’s apartment and breached the balcony door. Police officers are bound by a duty to protect life, which extends to the general public and not just victims of crime. WO #1 and WO #4 were acting squarely within this duty by entering the unit to retrieve Mr. Choudry’s pocket-knife and facilitate his assessment by paramedics. Furthermore, the Mental Health Act allows police officers to take an individual into custody for psychiatric examination if certain conditions are met and they have reasonable grounds to believe the individual is suffering from an apparent mental disorder that likely will result in serious harm to the person or another person. The police knew Mr. Choudry suffered from schizophrenia, had potentially absconded from psychiatric care and was not taking his medication. I accept that, when Mr. Choudry brandished the knife in the presence of police and refused to cooperate, the police had adequate grounds to apprehend him because he presented a threat to himself or others and demonstrated a lack of competence to care for himself. Finally, while Mr. Choudry effectively told the police to get a warrant, a warrant was not necessary for the police to lawfully enter the apartment. Apart from the likelihood that the police had implicit permission from the family to enter the unit, police are allowed warrantless entry into apartments to check on an individual’s well-being when there are exigent circumstances. [12]

The only direct evidence of what transpired in the apartment preceding the officers’ use of force comes from WO #2 and WO #8. After the balcony door was breached, both WO #2 and WO #8 observed Mr. Choudry standing in the living room holding a large kitchen knife in his right hand. According to the officers, Mr. Choudry had the knife extended towards the officers and immediately began moving in their direction. The officers commanded him to drop the knife to no avail and WO #8 deployed his CEW towards Mr. Choudry. The officer believed the CEW connected with Mr. Choudry’s torso but had no apparent effect. [13] At about the same time, as Mr. Choudry continued to move towards the balcony door, WO #2 aimed towards Mr. Choudry’s arm and discharged his ARWEN three times. WO #2 estimated that Mr. Choudry was about eight feet away when he discharged the ARWEN. WO #8 estimated that Mr. Choudry was five to six feet from the threshold of the door when this occurred. Both officers reported that Mr. Choudry was undeterred by the ARWEN discharges and continued moving towards the officers. WO #8 estimated that Mr. Choudry was about three feet from the balcony door, and five to six feet from the SO, when the SO discharged his pistol twice at Mr. Choudry. WO #2 estimated Mr. Choudry was four feet away from the door at the time of the shooting.

After the shooting, WO #2 and WO #8 described Mr. Choudry taking a couple steps back into the apartment and falling to the ground near a couch. According to the officers, he used his left arm to prop himself up and still had the knife held in his right hand. The officers moved into the apartment and yelled at Mr. Choudry to drop the knife. WO #2 shot at Mr. Choudry two more times with the ARWEN. With the ARWEN out of rubber bullets, WO #8 kicked Mr. Choudry’s arm with all his strength, causing him to drop the knife. Mr. Choudry eased himself onto his back and WO #2 immediately rendered first aid.

A video of the balcony suggests that about eight to nine seconds elapsed from the moment the officers breached the balcony door to the moment Mr. Choudry was shot, and about another six seconds elapsed before WO #2 fired the final ARWEN shot. [14]

Following the death of Mr. Choudry, it was suggested that Mr. Choudry was not capable of approaching the officers as described due to his poor health. The SIU gathered evidence from the Choudry family and Mr. Choudry’s physician which confirmed that Mr. Choudry was frail, unable to walk at the speed of an average adult and would need to take breaks after walking even short distances. However, WO #2 and WO #8 did not suggest that Mr. Choudry walked a great distance. Instead, they both described him moving a matter of feet during the interaction which occurred over about nine seconds. There was also evidence that Mr. Choudry would use walls or the furniture to support himself while moving around the apartment, but it does not appear that Mr. Choudry was incapable of walking unsupported. Mr. Choudry could walk without a cane or a walker and was known to walk occasionally to a nearby mall, albeit slowly and with frequent breaks. Based on evidence about Mr. Choudry’s medical condition, I am not persuaded he was unable to walk as described. As such, evidence of Mr. Choudry’s frailty alone is not enough to cast doubt on the accounts of WO #2 and WO #8.

WO #2 and WO #8’s descriptions of what occurred inside the apartment otherwise appear both credible and reliable. It is believable that Mr. Choudry, who had paranoid beliefs about the police, would approach the officers with a knife in order to protect himself, especially when he had already brandished a knife at officers earlier that evening. The officers’ statements were also primarily consistent both internally and with each other, and partially corroborated on important points by objective and forensic evidence. For example, the video recording of the balcony confirms the officers commanded Mr. Choudry to drop the knife after breaching the door and after entering the apartment. The video also corroborates the officers’ description of the timing and nature of the force used on Mr. Choudry. The forensic evidence is similarly consistent with the officers’ description of Mr. Choudry approaching the officers when he was shot: a CEW probe was found lodged in Mr. Choudry’s abdomen and the trajectory of the two bullet wounds was from the front to the back, and slightly downwards. The pathologist also noted a fracture to Mr. Choudry’s right elbow, which might have been caused by WO #8’s forceful kick. Lastly, the knife found at the scene was similar to the one described by the officers.

On these facts, I find that the SO was justified pursuant to subsections 25(1) and 25(3) of the Criminal Code in using lethal force against Mr. Choudry. While I have no evidence from the SO about his state of mind, WO #11 heard the SO say, “I had to do it, I had no choice,” immediately after the shooting. I am also able to infer from the circumstances that the SO held the subjective belief that he was required to use his firearm to protect himself and his partners from serious harm. Despite his frailty, Mr. Choudry was armed with an edged weapon, a kitchen knife with a 20-centimetre blade, which could cause grievous injury or death. At the time of the shooting, lesser use of force, including use of a CEW and multiple ARWEN discharges, had failed to deter Mr. Choudry. Indeed, Mr. Choudry had moved within approximately three to four feet of the balcony doorway (about five to six feet from the SO) and had shown no intention of stopping before the SO discharged his weapon. There was no realistic way to retreat because the officers were perched on a small, crowded balcony they could only exit by using ladders. There was also no time to switch tactics and try other methods, such as using oleoresin capsicum spray or a baton, to disarm Mr. Choudry. Any other option to respond to the threat, such as going hands-on with Mr. Choudry or closing the balcony door (which swung into the apartment), would have increased the risk that the officers would suffer serious injury or death. As such, I believe the SO’s resort to his firearm was objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional to the threat posed by Mr. Choudry, notwithstanding the tragic loss of life it caused.

Having found the SO resort to lethal force justified on the balcony, I accordingly find that WO #2’s and WO #8’s use of the CEW and ARWEN on the balcony was similarly justified. Had these options caused Mr. Choudry to drop the knife, there would have been no need for the SO to use his firearm and the officers might have safely apprehended Mr. Choudry. I similarly cannot fault WO #8 for kicking Mr. Choudry’s arm to disarm him inside the apartment. What is more troubling is whether the use of the ARWEN after Mr. Choudry fell to the ground was justified.

The post-mortem report suggests that Mr. Choudry was shot with an ARWEN in his mid-back and I believe this likely occurred while Mr. Choudry was on the ground. [15] At first blush, this use of force is questionable given Mr. Choudry’s frailty and position on the floor; however, I am unable to find it excessive. Mr. Choudry had shown determination in approaching the officers with a knife by advancing on them despite the CEW and ARWEN discharges. Even after he was shot, he continued to hold the knife, and also appeared to be using his left hand to try to get up. In this context and considering the need to immediately disarm Mr. Choudry to provide him with life-saving medical attention, I am unable to find the final ARWEN discharges excessive. In coming to this conclusion, I am mindful of the state of the law as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nasogaluak [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, which provides that “police actions should not be judged against a standard of perfection”. The law is clear that police officers are not required to measure the force they use with exactitude or to a nicety.

The second question is whether a police officer committed the offence of criminal negligence causing death contrary to section 220 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Choudry’s tragic death is one of a series of recent deaths involving police responding to individuals in crisis. In the wake of these deaths, there has been a call from families and the community to reform policing, including the way mental health crises are handled by first responders. There have been concerns that police presence can escalate these situations and make them worse. In Mr. Choudry’s case, his paranoia about police played a significant role in his death and these concerns have obvious validity. While questions about police reform are of clear importance, systemic issues in policing can only play a role in the SIU’s decision-making where they are relevant to the potential criminal culpability of an individual police officer. The offence of criminal negligence causing death is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked and substantial departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances. Notwithstanding the aforementioned-concerns, I am unable to form reasonable grounds to believe that the responding officers’ conduct approached this level of negligence. In fact, it appears the officer in charge, WO #10, made appropriate use of the available resources and reasonable choices in an ultimately failed attempt to safely apprehend Mr. Choudry. [16]

Pursuant to PRP policy, WO #10 as the Duty Inspector was required to assume responsibility for the incident. WO #10’s responsibilities included directing the police response and requesting additional resources where necessary. I am unable to find that WO #10 executed any of these responsibilities in a manner that constituted a marked and substantial departure from a reasonable person. To start, it appears that WO #10 made appropriate use of the resources available. The PRP has a Mobile Crisis Rapid Response Team (MCRRT) that consists of a police officer and a mental health professional. When WO #10 took control of the call, he was aware the MCRRT were unable to respond because they were busy at another incident. He cannot be faulted for their unavailability. [17] Instead, the TRU team took control of the scene. The TRU team is a specialized unit responsible for barricaded person calls and its members have crisis negotiation training. WO #10 was aware that the TRU team was negotiating with Mr. Choudry using a Punjabi-speaking officer to interpret. He believed Mr. Choudry spoke some English but wanted to ensure there were no misunderstandings. When negotiations reached an impasse, WO #10 called in the CNT, a team of crisis negotiators that could act in an advisory fashion. He also requested police contact the hospital where Mr. Choudry had been treated, speak with the family to learn about Mr. Choudry’s medical issues and seek advice from a mental health professional.

As it is apparent that the presence of police was escalating Mr. Choudry’s behaviour, WO #10’s decision to not permit the family to speak with Mr. Choudry is open to legitimate scrutiny. Mr. Choudry’s family had experience in calming Mr. Choudry and had helped facilitate his safe apprehension before. However, WO #10 explained that using a third-party to negotiate was inherently risky. For instance, using a loved one to negotiate with a person in crisis might prompt a dying declaration making the situation worse. In the present case, WO #10 was also cognizant that the family members had been unable to de-escalate the situation earlier that evening. In addition, a person without protective equipment (such as a family member, mental health professional or negotiator) would generally not have been placed near the apartment door when Mr. Choudry was armed with a knife. In the circumstances, the decision-making of WO #10 or the other officers was not without reason in this regard. In making this assessment, I am cognizant that WO #9 spoke with Mr. Choudry about his family and said his brother wanted to speak with him. In response, Mr. Choudry expressed frustration with his family and disinterest in speaking with his brother.

A more difficult question is whether WO #10 was criminally negligent in the PRP’s approach to apprehending Mr. Choudry. I cannot find fault in the initial plan to contain Mr. Choudry, keep other tenants sheltered and try to negotiate Mr. Choudry’s safe surrender with an interpreter. Instead, the real question is whether executing the DAP was criminally negligent. The police were aware that Mr. Choudry was afraid of police. Moreover, there is the real possibility that Mr. Choudry was unable to understand the officers as they did not speak Punjabi. On the other hand, the hope was that the element of surprise would prevent Mr. Choudry from taking defensive action and that the use of multiple officers would mean there were more “less lethal” use of force options (such as a CEW or ARWEN) to facilitate a safe apprehension should circumstances turn volatile. In addition, WO #9 had already explained in Punjabi to Mr. Choudry the officers’ concerns about the knife.

It is significant that the DAP was not implemented until after Mr. Choudry became non-responsive and its necessity had crystalized. The approximately 20-minute long period of non-responsiveness alarmed WO #10, who was worried that Mr. Choudry was at risk for self-harm. Beyond that, WO #10 was concerned about Mr. Choudry’s physical condition. He was of the understanding that Mr. Choudry was not taking his medication, had diabetes, a history of heart issues and recently had lung surgery. He had been advised that Mr. Choudry could barely walk or breathe and was concerned Mr. Choudry’s breathing was exasperated by the heat of the day. Faced with these concerns, and being unable to gain a visual on Mr. Choudry, [18] WO #10 was in a position where he had to weigh the risk of immediate intervention with the risk of not acting in the event Mr. Choudry was in medical distress. While I accept WO #10’s choice to intervene set in train a series of events with devastating consequences, I am unable to determine that this was a departure from what a reasonable person faced with the same choices would do, let alone a marked and substantial departure.

In the final analysis, as I am not reasonably satisfied for the foregoing reasons that the shooting of Mr. Choudry amounted to legally unjustified force or was the culmination of a criminally negligent course of conduct, there is no basis to proceed with criminal charges in this case notwithstanding Mr. Choudry’s tragic death. This file is closed.


Date: March 15, 2021

Electronically approved by

Joseph Martino
Director
Special Investigations Unit